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If an outgoing partner takes a bond of indemnity from the remaining partner,
against all the liabilities of the firm, and the obligor obtains a discharge in bankruptcy, and subsequently, the obligee is compelled to pay the partnership debts,
the discharge in bankruptcy is a bar to a suit on such bond of indemnity.

THIs was an action of debt on a bond, the condition of which was
as follows, to wit: "The condition of this bond is such that if the
said obligors shall well and truly pay, and cause to be paid, all the
debts and liabilities of the late firm of H. Tifft & Co., in which said
Fisher (the plaintiff) was a partner, and save the said Fisher from
loss by reason thereof, this bond to be void, otherwise of full force
and virtue." The bond was dated October 6th 1858, and was
executed on that day by the defendant, and also by Milton W.
Blackinton and J. E. Brewster.
It appeared in testimony submitted to the court, jury trial having
been waived, that previous to October 6th 1858, the plaintiff and
defendant, together with Blackinton, were engaged in business as
co-partners, under the firm of H. Tift & Co., and that the plaintiff
had sold out his interest in the firm to Brewster, and that thereupon the defendant Blackinton and Brewster formed a new copartnership, and having agreed with the plaintiff to assume the
debts and liabilities of the old co-partnership, gave him the bond
aforesaid for his indemnity. It also appeared that December 21st
1861, one Josiah D. Richards recovered judgment for $1964.42
against the members of the old firm, including the plaintiff, upon a
claim which he held against the old firm, and that June 1st 1868,
the sum of $673.33 still remaining due on said judgment, the
plaintiff was compelled to pay to said Richards, in order to obtain
his release from said judgment, the sum of at least $233.72. He
claimed that he was compelled, also, to pay for his release the
further sum of $370.16, making in all the sum of $603.91, which,
with interest thereon, he sought to recover in this action.
The -defendant set up in bar of the action his discharge in bankruptcy, under the laws of the United States, which was granted to
him May 11th 1868, and which discharged him from all debts and
claims, which were made provable by the law against his estate, and
which existed on the first day of August 1867, the day on which
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his petition in bankruptcy was filed. The plaintiff contended that
this claim in suit did not exist, and was not provable before his
payment on the Richards judgment, which was not made until
after the discharge was granted, and that, therefore, the discharge
was not a bar to his action. He conceded that if the claim was
provable the action was barred.
T]7urston, Bipley & Co., for plaintiff.
Samuel Currey, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DuR.FEE, C. J.-The Bankrupt Act, Revised Statutes of the
United States, § 5068, provides that "in all cases of contingent
debts and contingent liabilities, contracted by the bankrupt, and
not herein otherwise provided for, the creditor may make claim
therefor, and have his claim allowed," &c. The act also provides,
§ 5070, that "any person liable as bail, surety, guarantor, or otherwise, for the bankrupt," whether he has paid the debt or not, may
prove the debt if the creditor omits to prove it. The language of
these provisions applies broadly to contingent and uncertain claims
and liabilities. Is it not broad enough to cover the claim in suit?
The defendant relies upon § 5068, and unless the claim in suit
is otherwise provided for in the act, the section seems to be broad
enough to cover it. Certainly the bond creates, if not a contingent
debt, at least a contingent liability, and such a liability is within
§ 5068. The present Bankrupt Act is in this respect, as is remarked in Jones v. Knox, 46 Ala. 53, also in 8 Bankrupt Register 559, broader in its application to contingent claims than the
Bankrupt Act of 1841, and consequently the decisions, under the
Act of 1841, which are relied on by the plaintiff, are not fully in
point. The Act of 1841 was more like the English Bankrupt Act,
which extended to debts payable on a contingency or to contingent
debts ; but did not extend to a mere contingent liability. Hankin
v. Bennett, 8 Exch. Rep. 107; Trench v. Morse, 2 Gray 111;
.Riggin v. Magwire, 15 Wall. 529. The plaintiff contends that
the claim was not provable, because incapable of proof. We think,
however, it was capable of an approximate proof, which is all that
can ever be made in cases of contingent liability. When the defendant filed his petition in bankruptcy, the balance due on the
judgment had been due for several years, and there could be little
reason to doubt that the plaintiff, if he had the means, would be
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called upon for payment. And see Jones v. Knox, cited above,
and Jones v. The State, 28 Ark. 119.
It may be questioned, however, whether the claim in suit is not
"provided for" by § 5070, rather than by § 5068. The provision
contained in § 5070 is somewhat similar to a provision of the English Bankrupt Act, which extends to sureties and persons "liable
for any debt of the bankrupt." The provision of the English
Bankrupt Act came up for construction in Wood v. Dodgson, 2
M. & S. 195. There, on the dissolution of a firm, consisting of
three partners, two of them assigned their interest in the joint
effects to the third, and took from him a covenant to pay the debts
and indemnify them. The third partner, however, became a certificated bankrupt, and afterwards, the other two partners were
obliged to pay a debt of the firm. An action subsequentl3 brought
on the covenant, was held to be barred by the discharge in bankruptcy, upon the ground that under the covenant the covenantor
became in equity, as between the partners, the principal debtor,
and the other two.his sureties, and that, as sureties or persons liable
for the debt of the bankrupt, they were subject to the provision
aforesaid. And the same view was taken by the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals of New York, under the Act of 1841, in
Crafts v. Mott, 5 Barb. S. 0. 305; 4 N. Y. 603. There the
plaintiff and defendant gave their bond on a joint purchase of land.
The plaintiff afterwards conveyed to the defendant, who thereupon
agreed to pay the bond and indemnify him. Subsequently the
defendant was discharged as a bankrupt; and after that instalments
fell due on the bond which the plaintiff was obliged to pay. It was
held that the plaintiff was to be regarded as standing in the relation of surety for the defendant, and therefore that his right to
recover for the instalments so paid was barred by the discharge.
See also Mace v. Wells, 7 How. U. S. 272; Butcher v. Forman,
6 Hill 583.
These cases seem to show that the claim in suit is to be regarded
as provided for by § 5070 ; but whether provided for by § 5070, or
provable under § 5068, in either case any action thereon is barred
by the discharge. We think it was either provided for by § 5070
or provable under § 5068, and therefore give the defendant judgment for his costs.
Notwithstanding the great respect to
whieb the decisions of the Supreme

Court of Rhode Island are justly entitled, there is some room for differ-
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ence of opinion as to the point involved
in this case. Of course, all agree that
the claim here sued upon was barred
by the discharge in bankruptcy, if the
same was provable, otherwise not. It
is equally clear that if provable at all,
it must have been either under ? 5068,
as a "contingent liability," or under
j 5070, as a payment by one " liable as
bail, surety, guarantor or otherwise for
the bankrupt." To consider the last
ground first. Is an outgoing partner,
who still remains bound to the original
partnership creditor, and on the original partnership debt, liable as surety
or guarantor for his remaining partner,
merely because the latter has, as between themselves, agreed to pay the
whole debt, and to indemnify the other
from his liability, the creditor having
done nothing to release him from his
original and primary obligation ? That
he is still an original debtor and not a
surety, so far as the creditor is concerned, is of course admitted. If sued
by him, he must be sued as a co-debtor,
and not as surety or guarantor. As to
him, he is still originally and not collaterally liable. He would not be discharged or released by any extension
or indulgence as to payment by the
creditor to the remaining partner, as a
surety or guarantor might be. Would
he be at the same time principal debtor
to his creditor, and surety only as between himself and his partner, without
some express agreement or understanding to that effect? The argument is,
that because 'the remaining partner
ought equitably to pay the whole debt,
the retiring partner stands to him in the
light of a surety merely, in equity at
least, and therefore should be so considered, in a suit at law, by him against
the other, for contribution or remuneration. It is true doubtless that in equity
he may for some purposes be considered
to stand in the same situation as a
surety, strictly so called. For this reason, he would be entitled, in a court

of equity, if he was called upon to pay
the whole debt, to be suhrogated to the
rights of the creditor as to any collaterals or security he might hold against
the remaining partner alone, for the
same debt, and so might enforce them
in equity in the name of the creditor
against his former partner. See Butler
v. Birkey, 13 Ohio St. 515 ; The .,Eta
Ins. Co. v. Wires, 28 Vt. 93; XcCormickv. Irwin, 35 Penna. St. 111 ; Frood,
Jacobs 6- Co.'s Estate, 7"3Id. 459. But
this is allowed only in equity, and because it is for his advantaqe and protection, and in order to compel the real
debtor to jay the debt himself. But
does the same rule apply at law in a
suit by him to recover remuneration,
when the effect or it would be exactly the
reverse, viz., to deprive him of a remedy, and release the true debtor from
paving any one? Does the maxim,
cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex, apply ?
That is the question involved in Fisher
v. Tiffl.
•The English c~urts put a strict construction upon the words "surety or
other person liable for the bankrupt,"
and refuse to extend the term so as to
include those who might equitably be
considered a surety or person liable for
the bankrupt, such as to bail, who became such before the bankruptcy, but
who were not called upon to pay until
after. These were not allowed to prove
under the Bankrupt Act of 49 Geo. 3,
c. 121, s. 8, as a surety or person liable
for the bankrupt, and it required additional legislation to include their case
by express words. See Nwington v.
Kee ls 4 B. & Ald. 493 (1821) ; Hewes
v. fott, 6 Taunt. 329, 2 Marsh. 192
(1815). And see Goddard v. Vnderheyjden, 3 Wil§. 262 (1771). But the
bail of a bankrupt, who pays money
solely for his benefit, has certainly as
good a right to indemnity, and share in
the asseti of the bankrupt, and to be
considered as an equitable surety for
him, as a copartner has', who in paying
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his money only pays his own debt, and
for which he had received the original
consideration.
In Moare v. T iite,
h
3 Jur. (N. S.)
445, 40 Eng. Law & Eq. 366 (1857),
the plaintiff was under-tenant to the
defendant, and the defendant had agreed
to indemnify him against paying rent to
the head landlord, and then went into
bankruptcy, and the tenant was compelled to pay the whole rent. After the
defendant's discharge, he sued him for
the same, and it was claimed that the
plaintiff was "a person surety or liable
for the debt of the bankrupt," and
might have proved his claim in bankruptcy, and therefore it was now discharged. The term surety in the bankrupt laws, it was said, has had the
widest extension, and Wood v. Dodgson,
2 M. & S. 195, and T'ansandanv. Corshie, 3 B. & Ad. 13, were cited; but the
whole Court of Exchequer, without
even calling upon the other side, said
there must be judgment for the plaintiff.
So, where the plaintiff was the acceptor of a bill of exchange, which the
defendant, for good consideration, subsequently agreed to pay, and indemnify
the plaintiff therefrom, but went into
bankruptcy, and the plaintiff was compelled to pay the bill, it was held he
could not prove the same against the
defendant on the ground of being a
surety or other person liable for him:
Yallop v. Ebers, 1 B. &Ad. 698 (1831).
So, one who draws a bill payable to
his own order, and then endorses it for
the accommodation of the next endorsee, is not a "surety or liable for
the debt" of such endorsee, so that he
could prove in bankruptcy against him :
Mayer v. Meakin, Gow 183 (1820).
But there does not seem to be entire
consistency in the views of the English
o5urts on this subject, since it has several times been held, that an accommodation endorser is a "person liable for
the debt" of the maker so accommodated, and if the latter goes into bank-

ruptcy, the former, having paid the debt,
may prove against his estate, and so is
barred by his discharge: Bassett v.
Dodgin, 9 Bing. 652 (1833) ; Vansandan v. Corsbie, 3 B. & Ald. 13 (1819) ;
Stedman v. Mfartinnant, 13 East 427
(1811) ; Exparts Lloyd, I Rose 6; Ex
parte Yonge, 3 Ves. & Beam. 40.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts
considered this very question of Fisherv.
Tifft, in Morton v. Richards, 13 Gray 15
(1859), a case arising under the state insolvent law: st. 1838, c. 163, p. 3. That
stat. allowed the proof of any sum paid
"by any surety of the debtor in any contract, if the payment was made before the
first dividend." The plaintiff had been
in company with one Johnson, under
the firm of Johnson & Morton. The
latter sold out to one Daniels, and the
new firm of Johnson & Daniels assumed
all the liabilities of the old firm of Johnson & Morton, and agreed to indemnify
Morton against his liability therefor.
Johnson & Daniels then went into insolvency, and one of the old creditors
compelled Morton to pay his whole
debt, and Morton offered to prove the
same against Johnson & Daniels before
any dividend had been declared, on the
ground that he had paid it as surety for
them. But the full court refused to
allow it, on the ground that he was not
a surety, but a principal debtor, and in
paying it he paid his own debt. A
surety, said the court, is "he who becomes answerable, by contract with another, for the payment to him of a third
person's debt, or for the performance
of a third person's other undertaking
or duty." This case seems to be in
direct conflict with -isher
v. T'fft, above.
It is true, the U. S. Bankrupt Act uses
the phrase "or otherwise.liable for the
bankrupt," ' but does not that mean
otherwise similarly liable-ejusdm generisI The same general phrase was
found in the English Bankrupt Act, but
was held not to extend to all liabilities.
The phrase is liable for the bankrupt.
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One co-partner is liable with his partner,
but not exactly for him. There seems
to be as much reason for calling him a
guarantor for his partner as for saying
he is a surety. The familiar maxim
of noscitur a sociis applies. General
words are often restricted by prior specific words. Thus, the words " other
person whatever" after "tradesman,
artificer, workman, laborer or other person whatsoever," do not include every
person-a stage-driver-but only persons ejnsdem generis : Sandiman v.
Breach, 9 B. & C. 96 (1827). Nor an
attorney: Peate v. Dicken, I C., M. &
R. 428 (1834). A statute which forbids "any artificer, calico printer, &c.,
St., or any other person," from absenting himself from his employment, does
not apply to a house-servant : Kitchen
v. Shaw, 6 Ad. & El. 729 (1837).
A
statute which enacts that "no writ or
process shall be sued out against any
district surveyor or other personfor anything done under the act, without a
month's notice," does not apply to
every other person, but only to persons
ejusdem generis with district surveyors :
Williams v. Golding, Law Rep. I C. P.
69 (1865).
A power to tax "auctioneers, grocers, merchants, Se., and all other business, trades, associations or professions
whatever," does not include the business or profession of a lawyer: City
of St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559
(1872). A law prohibiting a person to
navigate "any lighter, wherry or other
craft,"
does not apply to one navigating
a steam-tug of eighty-seven tons burden, but only to vessels of the same
kind as lighters and wherries : Reed v.
Ingham, 3 El. & Bl. 889 (1854). A
statute, I that whenever the exigencies
of any army in the field are such as to
make impressment of forage, articles
of subsistence or other property," absolutely necessary, it may be made, does not
include all other property, but only similar to those specified in the act: White

v. Ivey, 34 Geo. 199 (1865). A statute
giving a board of officers power to
remove "for incompetency, improper
conduct or other cause satisfactory to the
board," means only kindred causes :
Stute v. McGarry, 21 Wis. 496 (1867).
Analogy, therefore, would seem to
sanction the conclusion that the words
"otherwise liable for the bankrupt,"
should be confined to liabilities similar
to those of sureties, guarantors, &c.
Thus far as to the argument upon the
question ; now as to the authorities cited
by the learned court. Some of them do
not apparently have a material bearing
upon the exact point involved. The
only point involved in Jones v. The
State, 28 Ark. 119, was whether a
surety on a bail-bond was released by
his own discharge in bankruptcy, as
against the obliges in the bond, a point
too plain to question. Exactly similar
was Jones v. Knox, 46 Ala. 53, a surety
on a guardian's bond. No doubt the
liability of a surety on a bond to the
creditor is, as between them, a contingent liability, rhich may be proved
against the estate of the surety in bankruptcy ; but that is very far from this
case. Here the question is not whether
the obligee of a bond can prove against
the estate of the surety thereon, but
whether some other party can prove.
The only point in Mace v. Wells, 7
How. 272, also relied upon by the court
in r'sher V. T{fl, was whether one who
was avowedly and expressly only a
surety for another, could prove against
the principal for a payment made by
such surety after the bankruptcy, on a
claim over-due before-a case clearly
provided for by the express terms of the
Bankrupt Act. It must be admitted,
however, that the cases of Wood v. Dodgson and Crajts v. Mott support the view
taken by the court. To these also might
be added Aftalo v. Fourdrinier, 6 Bing.
306, 3 M. & P. 743 (1829) ; Dean v.
Speaknman, 7 1lackf. 317 (1844) ; .FRrentress v. Markle, 2 Iowa 553 (1850);
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Clarke v. Porter, 25 Penna. St. 141 The same f'acts and circumstances
(1855), and perhaps others. But it which render a fixed "debt" not provmay be noticed that in some of these able because of some contingent event,
cases the retiring partner had either will have the same effect upon a conpaid the whole or more than his propor- tingent "liability."
A promise to pay
tion of the joint debt, and therefore was a certain fixed sum, if the promisor is
equitably entitled to contribution from ever able, is a contingent promise, and
his partner, independent of any special it may be proved in bankruptcy, albond of indemnity, which might give a though the contingency does not occur
stronger claim to prove, for the excess until after the petition is filed. The
at least above his share, against the liability of an insurance company bebankrupt partner; whereas, in Fisherv. fore a loss, is a contingent liability,
Tifft the plaintiff had not paid even a and if the loss occurs before a final
third of the joint debt, and his claim dividend, though after the company befor reimbursement rested solely upon comes bankrupt, it is provable against
his bond, and not upon any equitable them: In re the American Plate Glass
rule of contribution. This very ground Co., 12 Bank. Reg. 56, in which the
of distinction is relied upon in some distinction here stated is expressly reof those cases.
cognised.
In view of these conflicting decisions,
If a debtor makes his note to the
it is obvious there is room for honest creditor for part of the amount due, and
difference of opinion upon the prova- deposits it with a third person, to be debleness of this claim under the surety livered to the creditor, if he will accept
clause,
the same in full, and while it is in such
2. Can it be proved, under 5068, as a third person's hands, the debtor goes
"contingent debt or liability contracted into bankruptcy. he is at that moment
by the bankrupt ?" Was Tifft under a contingently liable on the note, and
contingent liability to Fisher when he if the creditor afterwards accepts it, he
went into bankruptcy, Fisher not then may prove it as an existing contingent
having been called upon to pay anything liability at the date of the petition:
on the joint debts ? To determine that Spalding v. Dixon, 21 Vt. 45 (1848).
question, it is necessary to consider
The promise of an endorser is a conthe distinction between a " contingent tingent liability, certain in amount, but
liability'" and a "liability depending its enforcement, or cause of action
upon a contingency." The one is thereon, is dependent upon the continprovable, the other not. The first is gency of due demand and notice. Such
an existing demand, fixed, established,
a claim is therefore clearly provable
determined, but the cause of action against the endorser, although the conupon which depends on some future tingency had not happened at the corncontingency. The other is a liability, mencement of the proceedings. For
the very existence of which depends the same reason the liability of a surety
upon some future event. At present it or guarantor may be proved against
is only inchoate, initiated, but not corn- him, though the default of the principal
plete. Doubtless the word "liabilidoes not occur until after the surety has
ties" is broader than the word "debts,"
gone into bankruptcy. All these are
since it includes unliquidated claims,
contingent liabilities, properly so called.
like policies of fire insurance, for in- But the liability of the principal to restance, and is not confined to fixed and imburse his surety is not a contingent
ascertained sums or debts ; but the con- liability, but a liability depending
tingent element is the same in both. wholly upon a contingency, the con-
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tingencv of the surety paying tbe debt,
and which may or may not happen,
even though the principal has made
default. No liability even exists until
the surety has paid the claim; he has
no cause of action until that time, and
the Statute of Limitations begins to run
only from that time. Consequently,
if the surety has not paid the debt prior
to the bankruptcy of the principal, he
could not (except for the express provision in the Bankrupt Act allowing it)
afterwards pay it and prove against the
bankrupt. He could not do so under
the mere "contingent liability" clause.
There was no liability from the bankrupt to him at the time of the bankruptcy,
but only a liability to a liability, an
exposure to a liability, but no more.
See McMullen v. Bank of Penn Township, 2 Penna. St. 343 (1845) ; Cake v.
Lewis, 8 Id. 493 (1848), approved,
though distinguished, in Stone v. Miller,
16 Id. 453 (1851) ; Pike v..McDonald,
32 Me. 418 (1851) ; Leighton v.Alkins,
35 Id. 118 (1853)
Wells v. Mace, 17
Vt. 503; Pogue v. Joyner, 1 English
241. These cases may have erred in
not applying the United States Bankrupt Act, to payments made by a
surety after the bankruptcy of the principal, but they are cited here only to
show that without an express provision of a statute, a surety could not
prove under the mere contingent clause.
It is like the liability of a co-surety to
indemnify his co-surety. If one surety
goes into bankruptcy and the other
afterwards, but before the discharge,
pays the whole debt, he cannot prove
for contribution against the other under
the "contingent liability" clause, for
at the commencement of the proceedings it was a liability depending wholly
upon a contingency. Such vwere the
uniform decisions in England and
America. See Porter, Ex parte, 2
Mont. & Ayr. 281 (1835) ; Clements v.
Langley, 6 B. & Ad. 372, 2 Ne. & M.
269 (1839); Wallis v. Swinburne, 1

Exch. 203 (1847) ; Dunn v. Sparks, I
Ind. 397 (1849), 7 Id. 499; Dole v.
Warren, 32 Me. 94 (1850) ; Swain v.
Barber, 29 Vt. 292 (1857); Goss v.
Gibson, 8 Humph. 197 (1847) ; Kerr
v. Clark, 11 Id. 77 (1850), and many
others. Tobias v. Rogers, 13 N. Y. 59,
is contra, but it seems to be quite out
of the current. It required special provisions of law to allow such proof,
which was first secured in England by
the Bankrupt Law Consolidation Act
of 1849. See Addns v. Farrington, 5
H. & N. 586 (1860).
The distinction between contingent
liabilities and liabilities depending upon
a contingency, is illustrated by many
analogies. Thus, a plaintiff
in a suit
at law is under a kind of liability
to
the defendant to pay him the costs, ifhe
fails in the suit; but this is not a
"contingent liability," but a liability
depending upon a contingency, and
therefore, if the defendant recovers
judgment for costs after the plaintiff
has filed his peojtion, though before his
discharge, he cannot prove against his
estate on the ground of an existing
contingent liability at the date of the
petition: Wilkins v. Warren, 27 Me.
438 (1847); Oxlade Y. North-Eastern
Railway Co., 33 Law J. C. P. 171
(1864) ; Dows v. Grisoold, 122 Mass.
440 (1877). So, a contract or bond
by A. to indemnify B. against any
costs he may be called upon to pay C.,
in a suit then pending between B. & C.,
is not a contingent debt of A. before
the suit is determined, and if A. goes
into bankruptcy before such termination of the suit, his discharge isnot a
bar to a subsequent suit on his bond, to
recover the costs subsequently awarded
to be paid by B. to C. : Hankin v.Bexnett,
8 Exch. 107 (1852).
It required
special legislation to meet such a ease,
as is now done in England by the Act
of 1869.
The liability of sureties on the bond
of a public officer, .cashier, treasurer,
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&c., is a liability depending upon a
contingency, and not a contingent liability; if, therefore, they go into bankruptcy before any breach of the bond,
and such breach occurs before their discharge, it cannot be proved against their
estate, and would not be barred by their
discharge. Woodward v. Herbert, 24
Me. 362 (1844) ; Dyer v. Cleavdand,
18 Vt. 241 (1846); Ellis v. Ham, 28
Me. 385 (1848) ; Loring v. Kendall, I
Gray 305 (1854); Fowler v. Kendall, 44
Me. 448 (1858). And even though one
breach had occurred prior to the bankruptcy, the English courts (prior to the
Act of 1861 allowing it) always held,
that the bond could not be proved, since
future breaches might also occur.
Marchman v. Brookes, 2 H. & C. 908
(1864).
Why can not a claim for rent, under
a lease for a quarter unexpired when
the lessee goes into bankruptcy, be
proved against a bankrupt as "a contingent demand," although he still remains
in possession ? Because, at the beginning of the bankruptcy, it was then uncertain whether the bankrupt would continue to occupy the entire quarter, and,
if he did not, no claim for a quarter's
rent could ever arise under the lease. It
was a demand dep ending qpon a contingency, and not a contingent demand.
Siavory v. Stocking, 4 Cush. 607 (1849);
Boslerv. Kuhn, 8 W. & S. 183(1844) ;
McDougal v. Paton, 8 Taunt. 584
(1818); Stinemetsv. Ainsee, 4 Denio 573
(1847) ; Prentissv. Kingsley, 1aPenna.
St. 120 (1848) ; Lansingv. Prendergaet,
9 Johns. 127 (1812). Such a course of
decisions was overcome only by the express words of
5071 of the Act of
1867, Treadwell v. Harden, 123 Mass.
390 (1877).
This distinction between a "contingent demand" and a "demand depending upon a contingency" has been fully
recognised by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Reggin v. .3aguire,15
Wall. 549 (1872). There, R. conveyed
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land to E. in fee, with a covenant, that
he had an indefeasible estate in fee
therein. In fact the wife of T., a former
owner, who was still living, had an inchoate right of dower therein, not having signed her husband's deed thereof to
R. Subsequently, R. obtained his discharge under the Act of 1841. Five
years after T. died, and his widow set
up her claim for dower in the premises,
which the grantee of R. was obliged to
pay, and brought suit against R. on his
covenant in the deed. It was held, that
the discharge was no bar ; that the claim
was not provable against R.s estate, it
not being certain that the covenant
would ever give rise to an actual duty or
liability, and the cases of Jemison v
Blower, 5 Barb. 686, and Shelton v.
Pease, 10 Mo. 475, cited as sustaining
an opposite doctrine, were wholly disregarded. See, also, French v. .4orse, 2
Gray Ili (1854) ; Bush v. Cooper, 18
How. 82 (1855) ; Bennett v. Bartlett,
6 Cush. 225 (1850); Reed v. Pierce, 36
Me. 456 (1853); Burruso v. Wilkinson,
31 Miss. 537. From the well-settled
doctrine that such proof could not be
made as a contingent liability, it was
found necessary to specially provide for it
underthe English Act of 1861, 153. Ex
parte Elwes, 33 LawJ.Bank. 23 (1864)z
So, in Fisher v. Ti 1?, the defendant had
given the plaintiff a bond to indemnify
him against any payments he should
ever be called upon to make on the old
partnership debts : that he ever would
be called upon to pay any, and, if so,
how much, was wholly contingent and
uncertain; thefoundationof the defendant's liability was laid, but "it might
never give rise to an actual duty or liability." Thus, it appears, that the claim
in this case could not have been proved
under the Act of 1841.
Is there any material difference, in this
respect, between the act of 1841, and
that of 1867 7 In the former the language is "all persons having uncertain
or contingentdemands against such bank-
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rupt, may come in and prove such debts
and clais under the act, and shall have
a right, when these debts or claims become absolute, to have the same allowed
them."
The language of the Act of 1867 is:
"In all cases of contingent debts and
contingent liabilities contracted by the
bankrupt, and not herein otherwise provided for, the creditor may claim therefor, and have his claim allowed, with a
right to share in the dividends, if the
contingency shall happen before the
order for the final dividend, or he may
at any time apply to the court to have
the present value of the debt or liability
ascertained and liquidated, which shall
then be done in such manner as the court
shall order, and he shall be allowed to
prove for the amount so ascertained."
Are the words "contingent debts and
contingent liabilities" any freer from
uncertainty and contingency (the only
point now material) than the words" uncertain and contingent demand," or, as
afterwards called, "such debts and
claims ?" The decisions, under the recent act, seem to agree with those under
the former law.
A bond by a defendant in a suit to return to the plaintiff the property in controversy, if such shall be the final decision, is not a contingent liability, within
the meaning of the act, and if he goes
into bankruptcy, and obtains a discharge
before the suit is decided, his discharge
is no bar. It was a liability depending
upon a contingency, and not an existing
contingent liability. United States v.
Rob Roy, 13 Bank. Reg. 235; 1 Woods
43 (1870).
A. deposits property on storage with
B. for a reasonable compensation, but
no time being fixed. After it remains a
while A. obtains his discharge in bankruptcy, but the property still remains in
B.'s possession. For the storage, which
accrued after the bankruptcy, A.'s discharge is no bar. There was no existing contingent.liability for future stor-

age, when A. went into bankruptcy. It
was contingent, and uncertain, whether
there ever would be any Triore liability,
but not a contingent debt or liability
within the meaningof the act. Robinson
v. Pesant, 53 N. Y. 419 (1873).
In a suit against M. the property of
H. was attached, as M.'s H. gave abond
to dissolve the attachment, and J. became
his surety thereon, and H. placed property in J.'s hands to secure him from
liability as surety, and to hold the same
until the litigation terminated. Beforeit terminated J. went into bankruptcy
and received his discharge, still having
the property in his possession. Subsequently the suit against M. was dismissed, and J, then refused to redeliver the
property to H.,and pleaded his discharge
in bankruptcy. Held, no bar, because
the very, existence of the claim for a return of the property by J. was contingent upon an event which did not occur
until after the discharge of the bankrapt. H. had no claim against J. until
the question of J.'s liability on the bond
as surety for 11. had been determined.
Jacobson v. Home, 52 Miss. 185 (1876).
L. gave B. a continuing guaranty for
goods to be supplied to K. to the amount
of 2001., and then obtained his discharge
in bankruptcy. B. continued to supply
K. with goods after the bankruptcy.
Held, that L. was liable, notwithstanding his discharge; that the guaranty was
not a "contingent liability" under 12 &
13Viet. c. 106,j 178 (1849). Boydv.
Robins, 5 C. B. N. S. 497 (1858), re.
versing s. c. in 4 Id. 749.
Notwithstanding the English statute
has now become by repeated amendments much broader than ours in allowing claims "depending upon a contingency," yet they steadily refuse to allow
bonds of indemnity to be proved against
the bankrupt, where the breach did not
occur until after the filing of his petition. See Betterley v. Stainsby, Law
Rep. 2 C. P. 568 (1867) ; Ex parte
1iiscinan, Law Rep. 8 Ch. App. 35
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(1871) ; Kellock v. Enthoven, Law Rep.
8 Q. B. 458; 9 Id. 241 (1871).
Especially is this the case where the
contract of indemnity is a contract not
to be performed once for all on the happening of a single contingency, but one
which is liable to be broken repeatedly
at different times, upon the happening
of various contingencies, and where separate damages could be recovered for
each breach : Law Rep. 8 Ch. App. 35;
which is the precise case of Fiser v.
Tifll.
And they give two very good reasons
for it. The first is that in cases like
Fisher v. Tifft there is a double contingency, first that the obligor or bankrupt
does not pay the debt himself, and second that if he does not, the holder of
the indemnity will be called upon to pay,
or be able to pay if he is ; and they say
the bankrupt act did not intend to include contracts involving such double
contingencies, but only one single contingency. This view was expressed in
Mitcalfe v. Hanson, Law Rep. I H. L.
242 (1866).
The other isthat the non-payment of
his own debt by the bankrupt himself is
not a contingency at all within the meaning of the statute; that the word as
there used means something casual, fortuitous, not something depending upon
the mere will or whim of the obligor.
To make the act apply to such a case
would mhke it within the power of a
bankrupt to make a claim provable or
not against him, according to his election. In BetterleV v. Stainsby, Law
Rep.2 C.P. 570, WILLES, J., says: "It
was also decided in Maples v. Pepper,
18 C. B. 177, that a contingency that a
bankrupt should break his contract is
not such a contingency as is meant by
the act."
For the same reason it ought not to
be in the power of the party having the
indemnity to pay the outstanding claims
before the final dividend, so as to prove
his claim and share in the assets, or,

by delaying to pay the creditors until
after the final dividend, hold his claim
over the bankrupt for future collection.
Such an election might give him a dangerous power over the proceedings. It
would seem, therefore, that there is
even less foundation for proving this
claim under
5068, the contingent
clause, than under
5070, the surety
clause. And there are some serious practical difficulties against proving undereither. For how much amount shall he
prove ? The bond of indemnity in this
particular case, it should be noted, was
not confined to any particular specified
debt, the amount of which was known,
or could be readily ascertained, but for
" all the debts and liabilities" of the
late firm, the amounts and names
of creditors being left entirely uncertain. How could Fisher know how
much was due from Tiff't? He had
left the firm ten years before. How
could he know how much, if anything,
he would be called upon to pay before
the final dividend? How much would
he be able to pay before that day?
Could he prove for the whole penalty
of the bond, and share in the dividends
on the whole amount, irrespective of the
amount he should be called upon to pay.
before distribution, or shall his percentage be computed only on the
amount so paid? And if he proved
for the Ohole bond, and took a dividend only on what he paid before distribution, but should pay another claim
after that event, could he divide the
bankrupt's indemnity bond and recover
for the latter, but not the former?
Another test is this : the Bankrupt
Act before quoted, as to contingent
claims, provides that if a claim is
provable, its present valde may be
ascertained and liquidated, and the
creditor allowed to prove for that
amount, implying that such claims
only could be proved as could be thus
valued. But how could the- value
of Fisher's indemnity against Tifft
in
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this case be valued ? The whole amount
of the claims for which he was liable
was unknown ; there was no certain,
reliable mode of ascertaining them.
Fisher would not know; Tift might
not know; there is no way to.compel
creditors to come forward and disclose
their claims against Tif't & Co. And
if these were all known, it might be

impossible to determine how much
Fisher would ever really pay on them,
and so how much would be the "present value" of his bond of indemnity?
Theoretically and practically, therefore,
the question of proof in such cases is
certainly not free from embarrassment.
EDMUND

HL BENcEav,

Supreme Court of New Jersey.
STATE, JAMES ROCHE, PROSECUTOR, v. THE MAYOR, &c., o1r
JERSEY CITY.
Every statute must be considered according to what appears to have been the
Intention of the legislature, and even though two statutes relating to the same
subject be not, in terms, repugnant or inconsistent, if the later statute is clearly
intended to prescribe the only rule which should govern the case provided for, it
will be construed as repealing the earlier act. The rule does not rest strictly
upon the ground of repeal by implication, but upon the principle that when the
legislature makes a revision of a particular statute, and frames a new statute upon
the subject-matter, and from the framework of the act it is apparent that the legislature designed a complete seheme for this matter, it is a legislative declaration
that whatever is embraced in the new law shall prevail, and whatever is excluded
is discarded. It is decisive evidence of an intention to prescribe the provisions
contained in the later act as the only ones on that subject which shall be
obligatory.
The rule in this case applied to the ordinances of a municipal corporation.

THIS was a certiorari to a police justice to bring up the record
of a conviction of James Roche, under an ordinance of Jersey City,
for selling liquor on Sunday. The facts are sufficiently stated in
the opinion.
C. H. Winfield, for the plaintiff.
H. Traphagenand Gilbert Collins, for the defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
VAN SYCKEL, J.--James Roche, the prosecutor, was convicted
before a police justice for violating the ninth section of an ordinance
of Jersey City, passed July 8th 1862, which prohibits the sale of
intoxicating liquors on Sunday.
The question presented by this case is, whether the ninth, tenth
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and eleventh sections of that ordinance, which forbid the sale of
spirituois liquors on the Sabbath, are in force. If not, then the
prosecutor was punishable only by indictment. Rev., p. 493, § 50;
p. 238, §§ 61, 62. By an act, approved April 2d 1869, Pamph.
L., p. 1377, Jersey City, Bergen and Hudson City were consolidated. Previous to the consolidation, each of these places had its
peculiar ordinances in reference to licenses and the sale of spirituous liquors.
The ordinances of old Jersey City (passed July 8th 1862), in
which Roche lived, by their ninth, tenth and eleventh sections,
prohibited the sale of intoxicating drinks on Sunday. By the one
hundred and twenty-second section of the Act of 1869, Pamph. L.,
p. 1427, it was provided "that all ordinances of Jersey City, as at
present incorporated, or other ordinances now in force in other cities
hereby consolidated, that may be in force when this act goes into
effect, so far as they may be applicable to the city hereby incorporated, and so far as not inconsistent with this act, shall be in
force until altered or repealed by the common council hereby
created."
The ordinances concerning inns and taverns in the several cities
which had been consolidated being very conflicting, it \Was difficult
to etermine which of them were to be applied to the whole city.
This difficulty was met by the charter of 1870, Pamph. L., p.
1170, § 195, which provided that the various ordinances should be
in force within the limits of the city for which they were enacted
respectively, and until altered or repealed by the aldermen by that
act created. The effect of this legislation was to leave the ordinances of each of the three cities which had been consolidated, in
force within the limits for which they had been originally passed,
until altered or repealed.
By the Act of 1870, Pamph. L., p. 1195, power was given to
the board of aldermen to pass, alter and repeal ordinances to license
and regulate inns and taverns, and regulate the sale of spirituous
or intoxicating liquors, or prohibit such sale within the city limits.
Under this authority, the mayor and aldermen of Jersey City
passed an ordinance, on the subject of licenses, October 4th 1870,
in which there was no Sunday clause.
Did this ordinance, which applied to the whole city, repeal, by
implication, the several ordinances on the same subject, which, up
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to that time, had been in operation in the several cities which had
been consolidated ?
It is contended, on the part of the city, that the ordinances of
1870, which omitted the Sunday clauses, are not inconsistent with
sections nine, ten and eleven, the Sunday clauses in the ordinances
of 1862 of old Jersey City, and that, therefore, those sections still
remain in force. The rule of law relied upon to support this proposition is, that courts are bound to uphold the prior law, if the two
acts may well subsist together.
The ordinance of 1870 does not expressly repeal the ninth,
tenth and eleventh sections of the ordinance of 1862, and it is a
familiar doctrine that repeals by implication are not favored.
When there are two laws on the same subject, the rule is to give
both effect if possible. But if the two are repugnant in their provisions, the later, to the extent of the repugnancy, operates as a
repeal of the former; and where they are not repugnant in terms,
yet if the later act covers the whole subject-matter, "and it appears
that it was intended as a substitute for the first act, it will operate
as a repeal of that act.
In United States v. Tynen, 11 Wall. 88, it was held that where
there are two acts of Congress on the same subject, and the later
embraces all the provisions of the first and also new provisions, and
imposes different penalties, the later act operates, without any repealing clause, as a repeal of the first. To have the rescinding
effect it is not necessary that the subsequent act should have every
provision of the former one; it is sufficient if it revises the whole
subject-matter, and an intention is manifest to make it a substitute
for the earlier act. Bartlet v. King, 12 Mass. 537.
In.Xurdock v. ty of Memphis, 20 Wall. 617, where the question was, whether the second section of the Act of 1867, by implication, repealed the twenty-fifth section of the Act of 1789, the
court said:' "A careful comparison of these two sections can leave
no doubt that it was the intention of Congress, by the later statute,
to revise the entire matter to which they both had reference, to
make such changes in the law as it stood, as they thought best, and
I See Nusser v. Commonwealth, 25 Penn. St. 126. In this case an act limited
to a single county, prescribed the mode of punishing an offence, and subsequently
an act was passed for the whole state, prescribing the punishment for the same
offence. Held, that the latter act repealed the former. See, however, McRae v.
Wessel, 6 Ired. Law 153.
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to substitute their will in that regard, entirely for the old law on
the subject. We are of opinion that it was their intention to make
a new law, so far as the present law differed from the former, and
that the new law embracing all that was intended to be preserved
of the old, omitting what was not so intended, became ccmplete in
itself and repealed all other law on the subject embraced within it."
The ordinance of July 8th 1862, was entitled "An ordinance
regulating inns, and taverns, and restaurants, and the sale of
spirituous and intoxicating liquors," and the ordinance of October
4th 1870, has precisely the same title. When the latter ordinance
was passed, it was expressly for the whole city, and it must be presumed that the aldermen, upon the subject of inns and taverns,
intended to make the alteration authorized by section one hundred
and ninety-five of the charter of 1870, and to establish a uniform
rule for the new city, which should supersede the prior legislation,
which had only a local application to one of its divisions. By
dropping out the Sunday clauses, uniformity was established by the
operation of the state law throughout the city. It cannot be supposed that in revising this subject it was intended to maintain a
different law for different parts of the same city, when the local
legislature had no authority to enact an ordinance which was not,
in its operation, co-extensive with the 'city limits.
It was only by force of the one hundred and ninety-fifth section,
of the Act of 1870, that the discordant ordinances of the several
cities could be kept in force; they ceased to have any effect when
the aldermen passed a uniform law upon the whole subject in 1870,
The authorized alteration was made by substituting a ngw ordi-_
nance on the same subject, which omitted the peculiarities of the
it such. pIovisoms as itwas
prior local law, and gelected fro'o
retain.
to
deemed desirAble
When a statute is revised., or one act framed fronj another, some
parts being opitted, the parts omitted are not revived by construction, but are to be considered as aunulled. State v. Wilson, 43
N. Hamp. 419; _Farrv. Brackett, 30 Vt. 344; Giddings v. Cox,
31 Vt. 607 ; Piingre v. Snelt, 42 Mi.e 5a.
Every statute must be considered according to what 'ppears to
have been the intention of the legislature, and even though two
statutes, relating to the same subject, be not in terms repugnant or
inconsistent2 if the lt.r st .tute isclearly tended to prescribe
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the only rule which should govern the case provided for, it will be
construed as repealing the original act.
The rule does not rest strictly upon the ground of repeal by
implication, but upon the principle that when the legislature makes
a revision of a particular statute, and frames a new statute upon
the subject-matter, and from the framework of the act it is apparent
that the legislature designed a complete scheme for this matter, it
is a legislative declaration that whatever is embraced in the new
law shall prevail, and whatever is excluded is discarded. It is
decisive evidence of an intention to prescribe the provisions contained in the later act as the only ones on that subject which shall
beobligatory. Sacramento v. Bird,15 Cal. 294; State v. Conkling,
19 Cal. 501.
In 1871, a new charter was passed for Jersey City. Laws of 1371,
p. 1094. By section one hundred and sixtyreight of this act, the
,charter of 1870 was repealed, with a proviso that "all ordinances
now in force in said city, so far as consistent with this .act, and
applicable to the government hereby contemplated, shall remain in
force until altered or repealed, and no longer."
There is a marked difference between this language and that of
the proviso in section one hundred nd ninety-fiye of the charter of
1870. The latter, in terms, saved the local ordinances of the
several cities composing the new city, while the Act of 1871 seems
to contemplate the existence of the fact, that under the charter of
1870, the city authorities had exercised the granted power to unify
the discordant ordinances, and it preserves only those ordinances in
force in the city, not those in force in parts of the city, so far as
consistent with the Act of 1871, and applicable to the government
thereby created. I think the language in this section shows that
it was not designed to perpetuate the anomalous state of things
which existed when the charter of 1870 was framed.
It is true that the language "in force in the city," might include
"laws in force in parts of the city," yet the fact that the apt words
used in the charter of 1870 to save such local laws, were dropped
out of the saving clause in the charter of 1871, is significant of the
legislative intent.
In my opinion, the ordinance of June 6th 1871, expresses the
will of the legislative department of the city government upon the
entire subject mentioned in its title, and its effect is to annul all
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provisions in the ordinance of 1862 which were not incorporated in it.
The judgment below was without authority, and should be set
aside, with costs.
A statute may be repealed either (1)
by ihe express words of a subsequent
statute, or (2) by necessary implication.
No proposition, however, is better
settled upon authority than that repeals
by implication are not favored by the
law : Foster's Case, 11 Cck. 63, a ; McCool v. Smith, 1 Black 470; Wallace
v. Bassett, 41 Barb. 92; Breitung v.
Lindauer, 37 Mich. 217 ; Hogan v. Guion, 29 Gratt. 705; Smith v. Vicksburg,
54 Miss. 615; United States v. One
Case of Hair Pencils, 1 Paine 400; State
v. Judge of St. Louis Probate Court, 38
Mo. 529; &ate v. Berry, 12 Iowa 58;
People v. San Francisco, 4-c., Railroad
Co., 28 Cal. 254; Blain v. Bailey, 25
Ind. 165 ; Conner v. Southern Express
Co., 37 Geo. 397 ; People v. Barr, 44
Ill. 198; Snell v. Bridgewater Co., 24
Pick. 296 ; Buckingham v. Steubenville,
4-c., Railroad Co., 10 Ohio St. 25 ; Furman v. Nichol, 3 Coldw. 432; Bowen v.
Lease, 5 Hill 221 ; Goodrich v. Milwaukee, 24 Wis. 422; Horton v. Mobile
School Commissioners, 43 Ala. 598; Kerlinger v. Barnes, 14 Minn. 526; State
v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378. The same
rule applies to repeals by implication
effected by the adoption of a new state
constitution: Ohio ex rel. Evans v. Dudley, I Ohio St. 437 ; Cass v. Dillon, 2
Id. 607.
The rule is generally stated to be,
that in order that a prior statute should
be repealed by a subsequent affirmative
statute upon the same subject, containing no negative words or express repealing clause, there must be a direct
and irreconcilable conflict between the
two statutes. If the two acts can by
any reasonable construction be reconciled and made to stand together, the
Vez. XXVII.-4

latter statute will not work a repeal
of the former: State v. Blake, 35 N. J.
Law 208; The People v. Palmer, 52 N.
Y. 83; Bowen v. Lease, 5 Hill 221 ;
Williams v. Potter, 2 Barb. 316; People v. Deming, 1 Hilton 271 ; People v.
Van Nort, 64 Barb. 205; Fowler v.
Pirkins, 77 Ill. 271 ; Covington v. City
of East St. Louis, 78 Id. 548; Iverson
v. State, 52 Ala. 170; Forqueran v.
Donnally, 7 W. Va. 114; Smith v.
Hickman, Cooke (Tenn.) 330; McCartee v. Orphan Asylum, 9 Cow. 437 ;
State v. Woodside, 9 Ired. L. 496; Conservators of River Thames v. Hall, Law
Rep. 3 C. P. 415; Thorpe v. Adams,
Law Rep. 6 C. P. 125; Reg. v. Champneys, Id. 394; Warrington, Ex parte, 3
De G., l. & G. 159 ; Dakins v. Seaman, 9 M. & W. 777 ; McCool v. Smith,
I Black 459 ; Brown v. County Commissioner, 21 Penna. St. 37; Easton Bank
v. Commonwealth, 10 Id. 448; Street v.
Commonwealth, 6 W. & S. 209; Pratt
v. Atlantic, 4-c., Railroad Co., 42 Me.
579; Richards v. Patterson, 30 Miss.
583; Buchanan v. Robinson, 59 Tenn.
147; Hogan v. Guion, 29 Gratt. 705;
Smith v. Vicksburg, 54 Miss. 615;
United States v. One Case of Hair Pencils, 1 Paine 400; State v. Judge of St.
Louis Probate Court, 38 Mo. 529; State
v. Severance, 55 Id. 378. Cases upon
this point and the second point preceding might easily be multiplied.
If the subsequent statute is inconsistent with and repugnant to the provisions of the prior statute, so that they
cannot both stand together, it operates
as a repeal of the prior statute; but
such repeal by implication will in general be limited to repealing as little as
possible of the former statute, and, unless a contrary intention is manifest,
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will ordinarily extend only to the contradictory parts of such statute: Hayden v. Carroll, 3 Ridg. P. C. 599 ;
Wood v. United &tates,16 Pet. 342. See
also the cases above cited.
After all, however, the intention
of the legislature controls the courts in
determining whether a former law is
repealed or not. Whatever that body
manifestly intended is to be received by
the courts as having been done by it,
provided it has in some manner indicated
or expressed that intention :I Thorpe v.
Schooling, 7 Nev. 15 ; United Sates v.
One Case of Hair Pencils, 1 Paine 400;
Waterworks Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Ind.
364; State v. Severance, 55 Mo. 378.
A law will not be held to be repealed
by implication where the legislature
have shown no design to repeal it, being ignorant of its existence or the
scope of its provisions : Tyson v. Postlethwaite, 13 Ill. 727.
Upon this principle of intention,
if the co-existence of two sets of provisions in two acts would be destructive
of the object for which they were
passed, the earlier will be repealed by
the later. Thus, where a local act authorized one body to name the streets
and number the houses of a town, and
a later act gave the same power to another body, it was held that the earlier
act was repealed by the later: Dow v.
Mfetropolitan Board, 12 C. B. N. S. 161;
a. c. 31 L. J. C. P. 223.
So, where the inconvenience or incongruity of keeping the two enactments in force justifies the conclusion
that the legislature did not intend such
consequences : Whiteley v. Heaton, 27
L. J. M. 0. 217; s. c. nom. Rex v.
Whiteley, 3 H. & N. 143; Smith v.

State, I Stew. 506; Commonwealth v.
Keiliher, 12 Allen 480.
So, an intention to repeal an act may
be gathered from its repugnance to the
general course of subsequent legislation : The India, Br. & Lush. 221 ; 33
L. J. P., M. & A. 193. See also Rex
v. Northleach and Whitney Roads, 5 B.
& Ad. 978.
So, acts which, although in pari ateria, grant a right conditioned on different things, are inconsistent, and the
inconsistency operates as a repeal of the
earlier act; as where the earlier act
granted an appeal within thirty days
after the confirmation of a certain report,
and the later act within thirty days after
the filing of such report: Gwinner v.
LeAigh RailroadCo., 55 Penna. St. 126.
So, a statute allowing appeals in all
cases is repealed by a subsequent statute
allowing an appeal whenever the judgment appealed from exceeds $5, but
containing no negative words: Curtis
v. Gill, 34 Conn. 49. See also Parrott v. Stevens, 37 Id. 93. Upon this
principle of the intention of the legislature, it is clear that the principal case
was correctly decided. The same principle, substantially, as stated in the
first part of the head note to the principal case, was also laid down in the following cases : Rogers v. Watrous, 8 Tex.
62; Daviess v. Fairbuirn,3 How. 636;
City of Sacramento v. Bird, 15 Cal. 294
Swann v. Buck, 40 Miss. 268; Indus.
trial School Districtv. Whitehead, 13 N.
J. Eq. 290; Dexter 0- Limerick Plank
Road Co. v. Allen, 16 Barb. 15 ; State
v. Rogers, 10 Nev. 319; Gorham v.
Luclcet, 6 B. Mon. 146; Pierpont v.
Crouch, 10 Cal. 315.
The authorities lay down the rule

I See, however, Mahony v. Wright, 10 Ir. Com. Law 426, per LEPROY, C. J.,
where it is said that "1it is settled by authority that the recital of an intentio
merely in a subsequent statute to repeal a former specific statute, will not operate
by implication to repeal the former statute, and that in order to effect such a repeal
there must be a clause of repeal in the repealing statute," or that there must exist
the irreconcilable repugnancy between the two before alluded to,-
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generally, that if a revising statute embraces all the provisions of an antecedent law or laws upon the same subject,
and reduces them to one system, such
revising statute virtually repeals the
statutes revised, although it contains no
express repealing clause : Bartlet v.
King, 12 Mass. 545 ; Ashley, Appellant, 4 Pick. 23; Co~nmnwealth v.
Cooley, 10 Id. 39; Pulaski County v.
Downer, 10 Ark. 588 ; State v. Conkling, 19 Cal. 501 ; Illinois, 4-c., Canal
v. Chicago, 14 Ill. 334; Wakefield v.
Phelps, 37 N. H. 295 ; State v. Wiltz,
11 La. Ann. 446 o Farrv. Brackett, 30
Vt. 344; Giddings v. Cox, 31 Id. 607;
Andrews v. The People, 75 Ill. 605;
Thorpe v. Schooling, 7 Nev. 15 ; Broaddus v. Broaddus, 10 Bush 299 ; United
States v. (JQeeseman, 3 Sawyer424; Devine v. Commissioners, 84 Ill. 590;
Burgess v. Railroad Co., 18 Kan. 53 ;
People v. Brooklyn, 69 N. Y. 605;
Breitung v. Lindauer, 37 Mich. 217 ;
Ex parte Smith, 40 Cal. 419 ; Hogan v.
Guion, 29 Gratt. 705 ; Stirman v. The
State, 21 Tex. 734; Rogers v. Watrous,
8 Id. 62; Commonwealth v. Cromley,
1 Ashm. 179; Coghill v. To State, 37
Ind. 113; Longlais v. Longlais, 48 Id.
60. See also State v. Whittworth, 8
Port. 434 ; Norris v. Crocker, 13 How.
429.
The same rule applies where the new
statute covers the whole subject-matter
of an English statute, adopted as law
in this country: .Mason v. TWaite, 1
Pick. 452. So, the revision by the
legislature of the state of Maine of the
subject-matter of Massachusetts statutes
in force in the former state, and the enactment of such provisions as the legislature deemed suitable to the wants
of the people of Maine, was held to
render the Massachusetts statutes no
longer of force in Maine, though not
expressly repealed: Towae v. .Marrett,
3 Greenl. 22. But a mere change
of phraseology in a revision will not
alter the construction of the law, unless
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it evidently appears that such was the
intention of the legislature : Matter
of Brown, 21 Wend. 316; Theriat v.
Hart, 2 Hill 380; Douglas v. Douglas,
5 Hun 140; Yates's Case, 4 Johns.
359.
In Louisiana, however, it has been
held that where the laws and jurisprudence of a country are reduced into the
form of a code, without any clause
of repeal, as was the case with the
Code of 1808, the rule of-interpretation
must be as in cases of successive statutes, hot to favor a repeal by implication, unless in case of manifest repugnance : Lyon v. Fisk, 1 La. Ann. 444,
It is held that a re-enactment in substance of an existing provision or section of a prior statute, in a later statute,
is not a repeal of such provision or section: Alexander v. The State, 9 Ind.
337; Corbett v. State, 22 Id. 1 ; Cheezem v. The State, 2 Id. 149 ; Martindale
v. Martindale, 10 Id. 566; Waterworks
Co. v. Burkhart, 41 Id. 381 ; Powers v.
Shepard, 48 N. Y. 540. Nor is the reenactment of a former section in a later
section of the same statute necessarily a
repeal of the former section. The reenactment may amount to nothing, and
thus have no effect by way of repealing
any former section: Mfartindale v. fartindale, 10 Ind. 566. In Alexander v.
The State, 9 Ind. 337, the re-enactment
of the former section contained an addition of new matter, and the decision was
made under the provision of art. 4, sect.
21, of the state constitution, providing
that in all amendatory acts the section
amended should be set forth and published at full length in the new act. So,
in New York, the amendment of a statute, or part of a statute, by making
the same read as prescribed by the
amendatory statute, thus incorporating
all that is deemed desirable to retain
of the old law in the new, is not regarded as a repeal of the parts thus
transferred, but from the time of the
passage of the new statute 'he whole
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force of the enactment rests upon the
later statute. Although the former act
remains upon the statute-book and is
not repealed, either expressly or by implication, it is no longer regarded as the
law of the land in respect to new cases
that may arise. The earlier act is
merged in the amendatory act, and a
repeal of the amendatory act does not
revive the original act, but both fall
together: People v. Supervisors of 3fontgormery County, 67 N. Y. 109. See also
Goodno v. Oskkosh, 31 Wis. 127 ; Kerlinger v. Barnes, 14 Minn. 528; Burwell v. Tullis, 12 Id. 575 ; Ely v. Holton,

15 N. Y. 595. If, however, it appears
that the legislature did not intend
merely to repeat or copy the language
of the original law, but, although using
the same words, intended them to have
a different meaning and effect, this rule
is not applicable : Kerlinger v. Barnes,
supra. Where, however, a subsequent
act, providing that a certain section of a
prior act shall thereafter read in a certain way, re-enacts some of its provisions, but omits others, it is a repeal
of such omitted provisions: The state
v. Andrews, 20 Tem. 230; sate v. Ingersoll, 17 Wis. 631 ; Goodno v. OshkosA, 31 Id. 127 ; Pingree v. Snell, 42
Me. b5. The court, in The State v. Andrews, though it was not necessary to
the decision of the cause, also laid down
the rule, that the entire section thus reenacted, in the subsequent statute was
thereby repealed. See, however, the
cases already cited contra.

So, in Ellis v. Paige, I Pick. 45, it
is said to be a well-settled rule that
when any statute is revised, or one act
framed from another, some parts being
omitted, the parts omitted are not to be
revived by construction, but are to be
considered as annulled. See also Blackburn v. Walpole, 9 Pick. 104; Pingree
v. Snell, supra.
But the doctrine that a statute is impliedly repealed by a subsequent statute
revising the whole subject-matter of the
first, is not applicable where the revising statute declares what effect it is intended to have on the former, as where
it provides that such provisions of the
earlier as are inconsistent with the later
are repealed. In such case only such
effect can be given to the revising act as
it directs, ana only the inconsistent provisions of the earlier act are repealed:
Pattersonv. Tatum, 3 Sawyer 164. See
also MLcRae v. Wessd, 6 Ired. Law
153. So, where a chapter of a revision
of general statutes repealed all acts and
parts of acts thq subjects of which were
revived and re-enacted in the revision,
or which were repugnant to its provisions, it was held that this must be con
strued. as referring to general- statutes.
and not as repealing all provisions
of village and city charters, previously
enacted, which were in conflict with the
general statutes contained in said revision: Walwortll County v. Village of
Whitewater, 17 Wis. 193; City of
Janesville v. Markoe, 18 Id. 350.
M. D. EWELL.

Supreme Court of Micligan.
LAKE SUPERIOR IRON CO. v. CATHARINE ERICKSON.
Where a mining company let a contract for taking ofit a certain quantity of ore,
but employed persons of supposed skill to watch for dangers from loosened rocks,
and in other ways retained a control over the mode of mining, and a servant of
the contractors was killed by the falling of a rock, the danger from which ought
to have been detected and guarded against: Held, that the mining company was
responsible.
The question of- negligence is generally one of fact, not of l-w.
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It is not contributory negligence for a servant to go into a dangerous place in
deference to th. opinions of others who are supposed to have, and by their positions
are bound to have, special knowledge which should enable them to judge of the
dangers more accurately than the servant himself.
THE defendant in error recovered a judgment, in the court below,
as administratrix of her deceased husband, Andrew Erickson, who
was killed by a falling rock, while engaged in working in the mine
of the plaintiff in error, July 9th 1877.
It appeared that Erickson had been employed, the day before his
death, as one of a mining gang, under the management chiefly of
Gustav Stenson, who, with his partners, had taken a contract for
mining and hoisting ore, at ninety-five cents per ton for ore, and
twenty-five cents per ton for rock. This contract having been made
July 1st 1877, for a month, and similar contracts having been made
in previous months, from the beginning of April. Erickson was
employed by the day, at $1.50 per day. The pay arrangement
was, that the company officers were to puy the men on the certificates of the contractors, deducting this pay from the final settlements.
These contracts were all let by Day and McEncroe, as officers
of the company, who had general charge, for the company, of the
affairs in the mine.
The pit where these contractors were at work had been carried
along the lode so as to leave the upper or hanging wall, which was
at an angle of sixty-five degrees, exposed from twenty to twentyfive feet high, and not far from the same distance along the level,
with no support or timbering of the hanging wall in that space.
Erickson was engaged in sinking a winze or ventilating shaft from
this level, and had sunk it about two feet and eight inches when
killed. The rock which killed him fell from about half way up the
hanging wall, and was just over the winze.
The chief controversy related to the question whether this rock
was previously in a condition which made it so apparently dangerous
as to require removal or timbering; and, if so, on whom, if any
one, was the risk and responsibility?

The opinion of the court was delivered by
CAmPBELL, J.-Upon a careful inspection of the record we do not
think any questions become material except those which bear on the
rights and duties of the various parties in connection with the mine.
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The other errors assigned do not appear to be founded on sufficient
showing in the record. The only one urged by counsel was the
rejection of a question put on cross-examination to Stenson, asking
him whether it was not his business, and that of his associates, to
be on the lookout and watch for dangerous places. We think that,
when the terms and conditions of his contract were shown, this was
rather a deduction than a fact, and he could not properly be allowed
or required to answer it. He was not precluded from explaining
fully the mutual understanding of the contracting parties as to
what the contract was, or as to usage.
It was claimed on the argument and this claim is based on the
assignments of error, that on the whole case there was no ground
of recovery. And as reasons for this position several legal propositions are advanced, which are chiefly as follows: that there could
be no recovery if Erickson was in the employ of Stenson as a day
laborer; or if he was not under control of the company or its officers,
and if Stenson and his associates were to mine and do their work
properly; or if he was willing to work after such examination as
was shown. And it was claimed in various forms that Erickson
undertook all the risks that were established. It will be more convenient to refer to the points raised in the wayadopted by counsel,
than to pursue every sub-division separately.
There was evidence that the rock in question had been considered
as dangerous some time before the contract of July, and that the
attention of Day and McEncroe had been called to it. There was
evidence of various attempts, by sounding it with an iron bar, to
ascertain its safety. There was conflicting evidence as to some of
the declarations of the mining officers on this subject. There was
evidence on one side that they expressed themselves decidedly on
its safety. There was also evidence to go to the jury that they
retained the right to determine what large rocks should be removed
and what timbering or propping should be done. There was also
testimony of the increase of water oozing from the seams, claimed
to indicate a gradual loosening. The theory of plaintiff in error
.was that the rock had been started by blasts from the winze, and
that sufficient care had not been taken to examine it thereafter.
It fell about two hours after a blast. Other matters of fact will be
referred to in their place.
It is proper first to consider the respective positions of the parties.
Day and McEncroe stood in the place of the mining company in
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making these contracts. There was no employment relation between
them and Erickson, who was laboring under the contractors. So
far as this changed the relative liabilities of the parties it must
operate in this case. But while there are cases in which there is
no legal duty or privity between principals and the servants of
those who contract with them, this lack of privity is not universal
and absolute. If, for example, a railroad company were to contract"
with a firm of car-builders to build cars according to given plans in
places under the entire control of the builders, there could be no
possible corporate responsibility for injuries received- by workmen
in their callings. But on the other hand it might be quite possible
for men to be employed in piece work in the shops of such companies
where they retained more or less control, when for the failure of a
corporate duty the workmen or strangers injured by that failure
might have a cause of action for the wrong directly against the
corporation, although it had not employed them. The case of the
M-ty of Detroit v. Corey, 9 Mich. 165, is a case where the corporation was held liable for neglect of a contractor in not properly
guarding against danger from an excavation in a public street.
The same principle was applied in Darmstetter v. Moynahan, 27
Mich. 188 ; Me Wiliams v. Detroit CentralMz7ls Co., 31 Id. 274 ;
Gardnerv. Smith, 7 Id. 410; Bay City & -E. Sag. Railroad Co.
v. Austin, 21 Id. 390; Continental Imp. Co. v. Ives, 30 Id. 448;
G. R. & Rd. Railroad Co. v. Southwick, 30 Id. 444.
No doubt the range of the owner's responsibility is very much
less in most cases where contractors are employed and have their
own servants at work than where the servants are employed by the
proprietors. The main question in such cases is whether any duty
remained which sprang from the proprietor's own position, and from
the violation of which the damage arose. In the present case there
are two principal inquiries, which are (1) whether the death of
Erickson was due to the fault of the mining company in not doing
what they were bound to do for the protection of those working in
their mines: and (2) whether Erickson himself was responsible for
running the risk vhich proved fatal. Of course both of these
questions are aside from the third question, whether the death was
accidental, and not due to the fault of any one.
The court below told the jury that there could be no recovery in
this case if the duty was on Stenson and his associates to guard
against such risks, and that the same was true if Erickson contrib-
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uted to the injury by his own want of care. They were also told
that there was no ground of recovery if the falling of the rock was
not under circumstances which showed that the company had been
guilty of such negligence as showed such want of care and caution
as prudent persons would not be guilty of. They were particularly
directed that unless the conduct of Day and McEncroe was thus
negligent and the cause of the mischief, there could be no recovery,
and that the company would be liable for their neglect or misconduct and not for that of any one else appearing in the case.
We think the court was correct in holding that Day and McEncroe represented the company for this purpose. They appear to
have had entire control of all the business that is involved in the
record, and we think there is no room to question the propriety of
these rulings if they were applicable, and not neutralized by other
instructions. In this connection it is proper to notice one of the
special assignments of error which is calculated to give a wrong
impression. The court is represented as telling the jury to inquire
whether the company used such care and precautions as "relieved
them from liability in this suit," and it is claimed this left a question of law to the jury. But the next sentence of the charge
explained what would or would not make them liable. Isolated
sentences cannot be allowed to be considered apart from their context. The instructions were not so separated as to create confusion, but were really but a single and correct ruling.
We think that unless the case was one too plain to go to the jury
on that point, it was properly left to them to say whether the accident occurred without any one's fault or neglect. It is not for us
to draw inferences of fact in such cases. There was certainly
evidence to go to the jury indicating that there should have been
measures taken by some one to either remove or prop the rock that
fell.
We think also that there was properly before them a question
whether Erickson himself was guilty of contributory negligence.
A great deal of testimony was introduced to show that there was
no apparent danger which could be discovered, and that the company was justified in treating the rock as -safe. There was also
much testimony to the contrary. The place was one not easily
examined by the ordinary mining lights. If there was no apparent danger it was not recklessness to work under this rock. 'If, on
the other hand, there was real danger, and Erickson was informed
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of it on the day he entered the mine, there was nevertheless
evidence that those about him who had practical knowledge of the
mine in which he was a stranger, acted as if they did not think so,
and the guards, usually expected against danger, were absent. The
duty of examining such places after a blast is confined by the testimony to dangerous places, and not made out clearly even there as
devolving on Erickson. The jury have necessarily found he was not
careless, and there was testimony on which they could lawfully act.
The question next arises whether the responsibility of protecting
Erickson from such a danger, if supposed to exist, rested on his
immediate employers. This was also dependent on testimony, and
involved some inquiry into their relations with the company.
Does it then appear so to bind the court and jury that the contractors in this particular service had the responsibility confined to
them of guarding their workmen from the probable dangers of their
employment? There is no dispute in this case upon the general
principle of law that a responsibility lies somewhere to prevent
workmen from being exposed without such protection as is reasonably required in a dangerous business. The law is very clear that
it is culpable negligence to avoid keeping mining works as well protected as usual prudence would dictate. And there is no doubt
that a common danger in mines is from falling rocks. The hanging wall being on an angle-in this instance of sixty-five degreeswith the level, any lack of cohesion in its parts must lead to the
fall of such part of it as is seriously loosened, and that fall must
be hastened by the concussion of the air or the blows of flying
roeks thrown against it by blasting below and near it. In the
present case the rock which fell being directly above the winze,
and only about twelve feet from its mouth, every blast in that
shaft would necessarily throw more or less rock against this sloping
roof; and this must continue until the shaft is either finished or
opened to such a depth as to deaden or destroy the upward force of
the explosions.
The fact that this rock was considered dangerous, and so reported
several weeks before the accident, and the further fact if true (and
the jury probably believed them) that there was a perceptible
iicrease in the dangerous symptoms, certainly imposed a duty of
either removing the real dangers or using such means as are generally deemed adequate to determine whether any danger existed.
The further fact that the hanging wall was composed of a species
VOL. XX=.-S
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of rock whose thickness was not found generally uniform, and which
was sometimes thin enough to possess no very great resisting power
to shocks of disintegrating agencies, was one which could not be
left out of view by any prudent calculation. A broad expanse of
some twenty-five feet square of rock, only supported by its own
cohesive power from falling, may, according to the testimony, have
weak points where it may give way unless propped, or unless the
unreliable mass is removed. There was testimony, which it is not
our province to pass upon, which indicated, if believed, that no
reliable test could be found for determining the solidity of the rock
when water was escaping through such seams as existed in this
wall.
We think there was a question fairly open whether neglect to
guard against the accident was not culpable. The jury have found
it was.
If so, the only remaining question is whether the jury had
proof before them whereby they could lawfully hold the company
to this responsibility.
Under the contracts shown by the proofs, the contractors had
nothing to do with planning the mine or selecting their working
ground, unless with very small discretionary' choice. The shafts
and levels and the winze must necessarily have been determined on
by the owners of the mine, and the mining gang worked on short
contracts. Their business, except in sinking the winze, was merely
stripping the lode of its ore, and the winze was apparently,
as it must usually be, down the lode. The pay for getting out
dead rock was but little beyond one-fourth that of getting out
ore, and work in the rock outside of the lode was not contemplated. They testified, and the jury must have believed them,
that the company reserved the power of determining when and
where dangerous rock in the wall should be removed, if requiring
removal by blasting, and of locating the supporting pillars or placing timbers to prop the wall.. Such timbering would be expensive,
and is not provided for by the contracts, which are confined to rock
and ore blasting and removal. Either the mine must be unguarded,
or else, on this state of facts, the company must guard it.
Under such circumstances it is very plain that the company,
being the owners of the dangerous property, and inviting men to
work on it, -their responsibility for its protection cannot be changed
by the fact that the work is done by the ton instead of by the day,

LAKE SUPERIOR IRON CO. v. ERICKSON.

or by the fact that the men who contract with them have laborers
of their own. By employing men to act for them in either way
they hold out the assurance that they can work in the mine on the
ordinary conditions of safety usually found in such places. They
guarantee nothing more than is usual among prudent owners, and
they do not insure against that which is purely accidental. But
they do tacitly represent that they have not been and will not be
reckless themselves.
If men choose with their own eyes open to run into danger they
may forfeit claims to redress. But it cannot be considered reckless
in men who are in doubt upon a matter which cannot be determined absolutely, to pay some regard to the opinions and assurances of those who are supposed to have and by their position are
bound to have special knowledge called for by their larger responsibilities. In the present case the assurances of safety given by the
mining agents cannot be disregarded, and were rightly subject to
consideration by the jury.
We think the jury were very carefully and correctly instructed
concerning their duty, and that there was testimony which warranted their verdict.
There is no error in the record, and the judgment must be
utfirmed with costs.
The importance of the point involved
in the foregoing opinion will justify inviting attention to other cases more or
less analogous. For convenience these
will be classified under appropriate
heads.
I. The owner of lands is under no
obligation to protect trespassers against
dangers iu coming upon them. If,
therefore, persons intentionally come
upon his lands without his permission
and without lawful right, and fall into
pits or encounter other dangers, he is
not responsible, even though he may
have been grossly careless in leaving
the pits uncovered or the other dangers
unguarded: Houmsell v. ,Smyth, 7 C. B.
N. S. 731 ; Stone v. Jackson, 16 C. B.
199; Hunt v. London, "4c., Railway
Co., 1 Q. B. 277; John v. Bacon, Law
Rep. 5 C. B. 437; Vanderbeck v. Henry,
34 N. J. 467; Hargreaves v. Deacon, 25

Mich. 1. This rule has been applied to
children, who were tempted to meddle
with exposed machinery, and wereinjured thereby: Mangan v. Atterton,
Law Rep. I Exch. 239 ; Wood v. School
District, 44 Iowa 27. Compare Keefe
v. Milwaukee, 4-c., Railroad Co., 21
Minn. 207. And to a servant, who
fell through a scuttle when moving
about for curiosity : Severy v. Nickerson, 120 Mass. 306.
2. But if one either expressly or by
implication invites another upon his
premises, for business or pleasure, or
other reason, he by so doing assumes
the duty to guard the other against
dangers which might be encountered in
accepting the invitation, or at least to
warn the person invited of their existence, that he may avoid them. This
point is strongly put in some cases,
where persons have been injured in ap-
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proaching the stations of railroad companies, by reason of their platforms or
other approaches being out of repair:
Smith v. London, 4-c., Railwvay Co., Law
Rep. 3 C. P. 326 ; Tobin v. Portland,
4-c., Railroad Co., 59 Me. 183; McDonald v. Chicago, 4-c., Railroad Co., 26
Iowa 124 ; Alich. Cent. Railroad Co. v.
Coleman, 28 Mich. 440 ; Chicago, 6-c.,
Railroad Co. v. Wilson, 63 Ill. 167;
Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28. The
obligation in this regard extends to
those who come to welcome others, or
to assist others in leaving : Zoss v. Missouri, 4-c., Railroad Co., 59 Mo. 27; but
not to those who gather in a crowd to
witness a passing parade, and are injured by the giving way of the platform: Gillis v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 59 Penna. St. 129. It is said in
this last case that if a traveller by foot
on the open track of a railroad crosses
a bridge which ought to be, but is not,
in its ordinary use, strong enough to
bear a locomotive and train of cars, and
a rotten board breaks down under him,
the company are not liable to him, for
they owe him no duty. See further as
to the general principle, Bush v. Steinman, 1 Bos. & P. 404; Southcote v.
Stanley, 1 H. & N. 247; Indermaur v.
Dames, Law Rep. I C. P. 274; s. c.
Law Rep. 2 C. P. 181 ; Chapman v.
Rothwell, E., B. & E. 168; Francisv.
Coc-rell, Law Rep. 5 Q. B. 184; El
liott v. Pray, 10 Allen 378; Freer v.
Cameron, 4 Rich. 228; Latham v. Roach,
72 111. 179 ; Sweeney v. Old Colony Railroad Co., 10 Allen 368; Pierce v. Whitcomb, 48 Vt. 127.
3. The duty not to expose others to
unknown dangers on one's own premises is as much a duty to servants as
to any others ; for, though by their contract of service they take upon themselves all the risks properly incident to
it, yet the negligence of the master is
not one of these, and if he sends his
servants into dangers to them unknown,
and which they'had no reason to look
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for, he will be held responsible for the
consequences: Coombs v. New Bedford
Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572 ; Grizzle v.
Frost, 3 Fost. & F. 622 ; Bartonskill
Coal Co. v. 3McGire, 3 Macq. H. L.
300; Mfalone v. H1awley, 46 Cal. 408;
Baltimore, 6-c., Railroad Co. v. Woodward, 41 bid. 268 ; Perry v. ffarsh, 25
Ala. 659 ; Strahlendorfv. Rosenthal, 30
Wis. 674; Paulmeer v. Erie Railway,
34 N. J. 151 ; Illinois Central Railroad
Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 183 ; Snow v.
Housatonic Railroad Co., 8 Allen 441 ;
Lanning v. New York Central Railroad
Co, 49 N. Y. 521 ; Lousrille, 4-c., Railroad CO.v. Caven, 9 Bush 559 ; Coughty v. Globe Woollen Co., 56 N. Y. 124;
Beh v. Carter, 68 Id. 283; Deford T.
Keyser, 30 Md. 179 ; Godley v. Hagarty,
20 Penna. St. 387. The rule has been
applied to a railroad company sending
out cars upon a track blocked with snow
and ice, in consequence of which plaintiff was injured: Fifeld v. Northern
Railroad Co.. 42 N. H. 225.
4. Where one is doing work under a
contract upon the land of another, the
primary obligation to protect his laborers no doubt rests upon the contractor
rather than upon the landowner, but
this is liable to be controlled by circumstances. The obligation to give warning of all dangers not apparent, is one
he owes to the contractor as much as to
his own servants, and to those employed by the contractor to the same
extent and for the same reabons. The
duty is of course very plain where, as
in the principle case, the landowner
takes upon himself the obligation of
watchfulness, and it then corresponds to
that of a landlord who, in leasing premises, covenants to keep them in repair, and is held liable to third persons
who are injured by his failure to keep
the covenant: Bardick v. Cheadle, 26
Ohio .(N. S.) 393; Campbell v. Sugar
Co., 62 Me. 552; Owings v. Jones,
9 Md. 108 ; Grady.v. Walsner, 46 Ala.
381.
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5. How far one may be liable to those held in Laverone v. Maugianti, 41 Cal.
who are injured in coming upon his 138, that one who keeps a vicious dog,
premises under license of the law is a as a watch-dog, is liable to one who, by
question not discussed in the books. accident, is put within the dog's reach
the
Suppose, for example, that a traveller and is injured; but that was upon
the
keep
to
right
no
had
he
that
ground
in
and
impassible,
finds the highway
passing around the obstruction on pri- vicious dog at all. But doubtless a
vate grounds, as he lawfully may, he man may keep a dangerous dog upon
lawfully as any other
falls into an unguarded pit, can the his premises as
due warning to those
he
gives
if
danger,
his
for
owner of the land be held liable
injury I Or an officer enters his house who might come within his reach : see
to serve a writ, and is precipitated Sarch v. Blackburn, 4 C.. & P. 297 ;
489. But beyond
through a trap-door, can the owner be Curtis v. Mills, 5 Id.
say, he would
should
we
question,
any
made responsible as for negligence ?
The question is one of no little interest ; be liable to one who, visiting his prefor while the party injured is in the ex- mises by license of the law, should be
ercise of a legal right, it must be con- assailed by a vicious animal of any sort,
ceded that the other, as a general rule, kept by the owner with knowledge of
may leave his premises in any condition his vicious propensity : see Blackman v.
he pleases, provided he does nothing, ,Simmons, 3 C. & P. 138; Sherfey v.
expressly or by implication, to bring Bartley, 4 Sneed 58 ; Loomis v. Terry,
T. M. C.
others into danger upon them. It was 17 Wend. 496.

U. S. Oarcuit Court, -EastenDistrict of Visconsin.
B. LEIDERSDORF

ET AL.

v. J. G. FLINT.

The maker of a trade-mark is neither an author nor an inventor, and a trademark is neither a writing nor a discovery, within the meaning of the provision
of the Constitution giving to Congress jurisdiction over the subject of copyrights,
and patents.
Congress, therefore, has no jurisdiction over the subject of trade-marks, and so
much of title 60 of the Revised Statutes as relates to trade-marks is unconstitutional and void.

Iw Equity.

This was a bill for an injunction to restrain an

alleged infringement by defendant of complainants' trade-mark,
used upon packages of tobacco, and registered according to act of
Congress. Both complainants and defendant were citizens of
Wisconsin, and the bill was based upon that provision of section
4942, Revised Statutes, which gives to a party aggrieved by the
wrongful use of his trade-mark, a remedy by injunction, -according
to the course of equity, in any court having jurisdiction over the
person guilty of such wrongful use, and was filed upon the theory
that this court had jurisdiction to entertain such a bill, though both
parties are citizens of the same state.
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Carpenter & Smitls, for complainant.
Jenkins, Elliott & Winkler, for defendant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The bill is demurred to on the ground that the court
has no jurisdiction, and the demurrer raises the question of the
constitutional power of Congress to legislate upon the subject of
trade-marks. The question is important, and appears to be new,
since, with the exception of -Duwell v. Bohmer, 10 C. L. N. 356,
we were referred, upon the argument, to no reported case in which
it has been determined.
The statutory provisions relating to trade-marks are contained
in Title 60, Revised Statutes, which is entitled, "Patents, tradeThey authorize the registration of trademarks, and copyrights."
marks, impose restrictions upon such registration, and confer certain remedies for the protection of the rights of parties who have
complied with the requirements of the statute. The remedies thus
given are mentioned in section 4942, which provides that "any
person who shall reproduce, counterfeit, copy or imitate any
recorded trade-mark, and affix the same to goods of substantially
the same descriptive properties and qualities as those referred to
in the registration, shall be liable to an action on the case for
damages, for such wrongful use of such trade-mark, at the suit of
the owner thereof; and the party aggrieved shall also have his
remedy according to the course of equity, to enjoin the wrongful
use of his trade-mark, and to recover compensation therefor, in
any court having jurisdiction over the person guilty of such
wrongful use."
The only clause in the Constitution from which it can be claimed
Congress derives its power to legislate upon the subject, is art. 1,
sect. 8, clause 8, which authorizes Congress "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to
authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." If the power in question is given by this
clause of the Constitution, then, inasmuch as by section 629 6f the
Revised Statutes the Circuit Courts are -invested with original
jurisdiction of all suits at law or in equity arising under the patent
or copyright laws of the United States, and in view of the act of
Congress of March 3d 1875, which confers jurisdiction in all civil
cases arising under any law of the United States where the amount
DYER,
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in dispute exceeds $500, and of the provisions of section 4942, Revised Statutes, above referred to, there is ground for claiming that
the United States courts have jurisdiction in suits which involve the

right to trade-marks, without regard to the citizenship of parties.
But in contending that the power to legislate upon the subject
of trade-marks is derived from the constitutional provision before
cited, it must be necessarily assumed that the maker of a trademark is an author or inventor, and that a trade-mark is a writing
or discovery within the meaning of that clause.

Argument, we think, can hardly be needed to demonstrate that
a law regulating trade-marks is not in any just sense a copyright
law.

The general meaning of the term copyright is an author's

exclusive right of property in the work which he produces. It
includes the right of the citizen who is an author of any book or
writing, any literary, dramatic or musical composition, any engraving, painting, drawing, map, chart or print, and of models or
designs intended as works of art. It is something which appertains to authors who, by their writings and designs, promote the
advancement of literature, science and the useful arts. An author,
by standard definition, is "one who produces, creates or brings
into being; the beginner, former or first mover of anything;
hence the efficient cause of a thing." The term is appropriately
applied to one who composes or writes a book "or writing," and
in a more general sense, to one whose occupation is to compose and

write books "or writings."
So, too, invention implies originality. Originality, not merely
mechanical dexterity, is the test of invention: Blake v. Stafford,
3 Fisher 305. It is the "finding out, contriving, creating of something which did not exist, and was not known before, and which
can be made useful and advantageous in the pursuits of life, or
whieh can add to the enjoyments of mankind :" Conover v. Boach,
4 Fisher 16 ; Ransom v. Mayor of N. 7., 1 Fisher 264. "To entitle
one to the character of an inventor, he must himself have conceived the idea embodied in his improvement. It must be the
product of his own mind and genius :" Pitts v. Hall, 2 Blatchf.
234.
The dissimilar characteristics of trade-marks and copyrights,
and inventions for which patents may be granted, have been
pointed out or illustrated in various adjudicated cases. A trademark has been very well defined as one's commercial signature to
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his goods. It may consist of a name, symbol, figure, letter, form
or device, if adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant, in
order to designate the goods he manufactures or sells, to distinguish the same from those manufactured or sold by another, so
that the goods may be known in the market as his, and to enable
him to secure such profits as result from his reputation for skill,
industry and fidelity: McLean v. Flemingi 6 Otto 254; Upton,
Trade Marks 9; Taylor v. Carpenter, 2 Sandf. 603.
The basis of trade-mark right is, primarily, the encouragement
of trade. As the court in discussing the subject say, in Partridge
v. Mench, 2 Paige 103, the question in such a case is not whether
a person was the original inventor or proprietor of the article made
by him and upon which he puts his trade-mark, nor whether the
article made and sold by another, under his trade-mark, is an
article of the same quality or value. But the court proceeds upon
the ground that the complainant has a valuable interest in the
good-will of his trade or business, and that having appropriated to
himself a particular label or sign or trade-mark, indicating that
the article is manufactured or sold by him or by his authority, or
that he carries on his business at a particular place, he is entitled
to protection against any other person who pirates upon the goodwill of his customers, or of the patrons of his trade or business,
by sailing under his flag without his authority or consent.
The name, word, mark, device or symbol constituting a trademark, may be devoid of novelty, originality, and of anything partaking of the nature of invention. As the Supreme Court say,
in Canal Company v. 01ark, 13 Wall. 322, undoubtedly words
or devices may be adopted as trade-marks which are not originally
inventions of him who adopted them. Property in a trade-mark, or,
rather, in the use of a trade-mark or name, has very little analogy
to that which exists in copyrights, or in patents for inventions.
Words in common use, with some exceptions, may be adopted, if,
at the time of their adoption, they were not employed to designate
the same or like articles of production. So, in McLean v. Feming, supra, it is said that trade-marks are not required to be new,
and may not involve the least invention or sill in their application
or discovery.
As is well shown by a writer who has, with evident care, collected the authorities on this subject, "vol. 7, C. L". J. 143, the
foundation of title to a trade-mark is priority of adoption and
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actual use in trade, and it neither in application nor discovery
necessarily possesses the elements of originality, novelty or invention. The power given to Congress to promote the progress of
science and useful arts is restricted to the rights of authors and
inventors, and further, their rights are only to be secured for a
limited time: Livingston v. 'FanIngen, 9 Johns. 566. This limitation in time is imposed by the constitutional provision itself.
But the right to a trade-mark is of common-law origin, and as a
common-law right is limited only by the period of its use, and
ceases only with its abandonment. Property in inventions and
discoveries did not exist at common law, and for their protection
we have to look wholly to the constitutional provision on the subjebt.
The consideration for which a grant is made by the public to the
author of a new and useful invention, of an exclusive right, is the
benefit resulting to the public from the invention. The consent
of the inventor to make his invention known and available to
others, and ultimately to give it to the public, constitutes the consideration for which he is entitled to receive protection from the
government in the form of the grant of an exclusive right: Curtis
on Patents, preface. Not so with trade-marks; for when the
exclusive right to use a trade-mark terminates, no corresponding
benefit results to the public. Its value is gone when it ceases to
be exclusive and becomes the property of the public.
Mr. Browne, in his treatise on Trade-Marks, says: " The rights
of inventors and authors, as long settled in Great Britain, were
familiar to the framers of the Constitution; and as Mr. Justice
STORY says, it is doubtless to this knowledge of the common law,
and statutable rights of authors and inventors, that we are to
attribute the constitutional provision being beneficial to all parties.
It was beneficial to authors and inventors because it maintained
their rights to the product of their intellectual labor; and beneficial to the public, as it would promote the progress of science and
the useful arts, and admit the people at large, after a short interval,
to the full possession and enjoyment of all writings and inventions,
without restraint. In short, the only boon which could be offered
to inventors to disclose the secrets of their discoveries, would be
the exclusive right and profit of them, as monopoly for a limited
period. A copyright is limited by time; a trade-mark is not. A
copyright is limited territorially; but a trade-mark acknowledges
no boundaries. They are unlike in their natures."
VOL. XXVII.-6
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In every aspect suggested, and in other respects which might be
suggested, it would seem that the analogy between property in the
use of a trade-mark and a patent for an invention, and between a
trade-mark right and a copyright, fails. Property in a trade-mark
exists independently of statute. It is otherwise with inventions
and discoveries. They, as is said by the court in Rodgers et al. v.
Philip et al., 1 Off. Gaz. 31, "1are protected only in consequence
of the constitutional provision on the subject, which does not apply
to trade-marks."
Considering with care the important question involved, and not
unmindful that the question whether a law be void for repugnancy
to the Constitution, or for want of constitutional authority to enact
it, is at all times one of much delicacy, I am constrained to hold
that legislation by Congress upon the subject of trade-marks is not
authorized either by the letter or spirit of the constitutional provision from which such authority is sought to be deduced. The
maker of a trade-mark is neither an author nor inventor, and a
trade-mark is neither a writing nor a discovery, within the meaning and intent of the constitutional clause in question.
It may be added that the constitutionality of the trade-mark
statute cannot be sustained under the clause which gives to Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several states, nor
in my opinion, under any of the provisions of the Constitution
which prescribe the legislative powers of Congress.
From these views it follows that this court is without jurisdiction
to entertain the present controversy, which, as before stated, is
between citizens of the same state.
Demurrer to bill sustained.
In this opinion Justice HARLAN,who sat at the hearing, concurred.
The importance of trade-marks and
,ne value of the interests involved in
them are shown by the increasing frequency of litigation in both state and
national courts during the last few
years. It is clear from the general
current of such litigation and the professional efforts to get the cases into the
courts of the United States, that both in
the legal profession and in the business
community there has been felt a want

of a more comprehensive and uniform,
and perhaps more convenient and available jurisdiction over the subject than
is afforded by the common law.
That this.feeling was generally en:
tertained, and that the Act of Congress
was appreciated as in some degree a
satisfaction of it, is shown by the "large
number of trade-marks registered under
the act, amounting to nearly fifteen
hundred a year, and apparently increas-
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ing as the community was becoming
familiar with the scope and usefulness
of the statute.
The sudden breaking down, therefore, of this statute, for want of constitutional jurisdiction over the subjectmatter by Congress, is a matter of very
serious concern, not to say regret.
*There seems, however, to be room
for great doubt whether the control
over patents and copyrights, given by
the constitution to the national legislature, was intended by the framers of
that instrument, or can be fairly held to
cover a subject-matter presenting so
many essential differences as that of
trade-marks.
The only reported case on the subject,
prior to the present, is Duwell v. Bohmer, 10 Chicago Leg. News 356. That
was a bill for injunction in the Circuit
Court of the United States, for the
Southern District of Ohio. The defendants demurred, and assigned for
ground of demurrer the want of jurisdiction in the court, the parties being
all citizens of the same state, and
"there being no act which confers upon
the United States courts jurisdiction
of the subject-matter in such a case."
The stress of the argument in the case
was upon the statutes giving jurisdiction to the circuit courts, and the nature of trade-marks as related to patents
and copyrights did not receive the same
amount of consideration as in the prin-

cipal case. But the point was clearly
involved, and is so recognised by
SwING, J., who says: "The copyright
and trade-mark laws all come from the
same source. So if the trade-mark law
of 1870 be a copyright law, then the
court has jurisdiction, without reference
to residence or the amount in controversy." The learned judge then proceeds to review the laws, and sustains
the jurisdiction upon the ground that
the Act of 1870, being in parnmateria,
is a copyright law. The decision,
therefore, as an authority, is in direct
conflict with the principal case.
Since the principal case was decided,
the same view has been announced in
the Circuit Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in Day et al.v.
Walls, 35 Legal Intelligencer 468. In
that case a bill for injunction was, upon
demurrer,. dismissed for want of juris.
diction, the parties being all citizens
of Pennsylvania. No opinion was delivered by the court, but CADWALADER,
J., said that he entertained the same
view as DYER, J., and had actsd upon
it in several cases previously.
The question may, therefore, be regarded as still unsettled, but the tendency and the weight of judicial opinion
would seem to be against the validity
of the legislation of Congress on the
subject.
J. T. M.
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Notwithstanding the records purporting to show a valid organization of a county
may be forged, and the necessary facts in regard to such organization may not
exist, yet any action of the legislative department of the state government subsequently recognising the existence of such organized county, will be effective to
validate the organization.
'A municipal corporation does not forfeit its corporate existence by non-user.
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Tims was a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto, to oust
from office the County Commissioners, Sheriff and Probate Judge
of Harper county.
Willard -Davis,Attorney-General, for the state.
Peck, _yan - Johnson, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
HORTON, C. J.-The confessed object of the institution of the
action is to legally determine whether the county of Harper had a
valid organization as a county. The records of the organization of
date of August 20th 1873, would seem to be regular and valid upon
their face; yet it is admitted by all the parties to the suit that
these papers were forged; that there were not twenty residents or
householders in the county at the signing of the memorial or the
taking of the census. The records purporting to show a valid
organization are simply "The refuge of lie- and the hiding-place
of falsehoods." If this were all that was apparent in the case,
then, within the principle of the State v. Ford County, 12 Kan.
441, and State v. Sillon, just decided, we would be compelled to
hold the organization of the county void and the defendants wrongfully exercising the duties of the offices named. But the legislature has intervened since the so-called organization was had, and
by its action recognised, ratified and made valid that which was
fraudulent in its inception.
At its session, commencing January 10th 1874, William H. Horner was admitted as a member of the legislature, and as a representative therein from said county of Harper, and served as such
member during the entire session of 1874.
By section 28, chapter 77, laws of 1874, the Board of County
Commissioners of Harper county, was authorized and empowered to
issue and sell or exchange the bonds of the county to an amount
not exceeding the sum of $15,000, or so much thereof as might be
necessary for the purpose of funding certain outstanding county
warrants to pay the current expenses of the, county for the year
1874. This act pre-supposed the existence at some prior time of a
county organization and a county tribunal that transacted county
business. From August 20th 1873, to. September 1st 1873, at
least, there was a de facto organization of the county in existence.
The governor then recognised the organization as valid, and had
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it proclaimed to be valid and complete. Within the principle of
the State v. .Pawnee County, 12 Kansas 426, we hold that the
legislative recognition of the validity of such county organization
made the same valid, although the original organizatioi was defective and fraudulent. It is contended, however, by the counsel for
the state, that if a de facto organization was instituted on the 20th
of August 1873, it was confessedly only temporary, and as there
never was any election in the county since, and as there have not
been since about September 1st 1873, up to August 5th 1878, any
officers in the county that said temporary and fraudulent organization ended in September 1873, and the legislative recognition in
1874 had no effect to legalize or validate it.
The reasoning is not sound. For a time, though a brief one, a
de facto organization actually existed. The legislature having the
whole control of the matter, recognised thereafter such organization, in ch. 77, laws of 1874, and thereby ratified it; whatever
the actual facts may be, we are bound to presume that the legislature of 1874 had full knowledge of the situation of .affairs in the
county, and passed the act of that year with a complete understanding of its consequences. The removal of the officers from the
county-, and the failure to elect officers, did not blot out or destroy
the organization given life by the legislative recognition.
Dillon says: "Municipal corporations may become inert, or
dormant, or their functions may be suspended for want of officers
or inhabitants, but dissolved when created by any act of the legislature, and once in existence they cannot be, by reason of any default or abuse of powers conferred, either on the part of the officers
or inhabitants of the incorporated place. As they can exist only
by legislative sanction, so they cannot be dissolved except by legislative consent or pursuant to legislative provision." Dillon on
Munic. Corp., vol. 1, sec. 115.
The same principle is applicable to counties which are quasi corporations, created by the sovereign power of the state, of its own
sovereign will, for the purposes of civil administration.
The point made that there never was any de facto organization,
for the reason that the persons appointed special county officers in
August 1873, were not residents and qualified electors of the
county, and were never there, is not well taken, as the record of
the case does not support this assertion. The answer alleges that
these officers were appointed by Governor Osborn and afterwards
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removed from the county, and no testimony has been offered contrary to these allegations.
Judgment will therefore be duly rendered in favor of defendants
for all costs.
Municipal corporations existing and
exercising powers bestowed upon them
for public purposes may be altered, modified, or abolished by the legislatures:
People v. 11Wren, 5 Ill. (4 Scam.) 269 ;
Richland v. Lawrence, 12 Id. 1 ; People
v. Power, 25 Id. 169 ; Clinton v. Cedar
Rapids, 4-c., Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455 ;
Reynolds v. Baldwin, I La. Ann. 162;
Police Jury v. Shreveport, 5 Id. 664;
Layton v. Neo Orleaq, 12 Id. 515 ;
Berlin v. Gorham, 34 N. H. 266; People v. Pinckney, 32 N. Y. 377; Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 29 Vt. 12;
tate v. Branin, 23 N. J. L. 484; Lynch
v. Lafland, 4 Cold. (Tenn.) G6; Waring v. Mayor, J-c., 24 Ala. 701 ; Sloan
v. State, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 361 ; Smith
v. Adrian, I Mich. 495; Marietta v.
Fearing,4 Ohio 427 ; Cobb v. Kingman,
15 Mass. 197 ; Barnes v. District of
Columbia, 91 U. S. (1 Otto) 540; and
it follows, as a corollary to this proposition, that where such corporation has
been recognised by enactments of the
General Assembly, all inquiry into the
regularity of its organization is precluded; People v. Farnham, 35 I1.
562; Kanawha, 4-c., v. Kanawha, 4-c.,
7 Blackf. 391,406 ; Syracuse City Bank
v. Davis, 16 Barb. 188.
These corporations are created for the
public good, and not for the benefit of
corporators: Berbert v. Benson, 2 La.
Ann. 770; Police Jury v. Shreveport, 5
Id. 664; People v. Farnham, 35 Ill.
562 ; and, therefore, after long continued use of corporate powers and the public acquiescence, the law will presume
in favor of their legal existence: Jameson v. People, 16 Ill. 257. It is the citizens of the city and not the officers who
constitute the corporation. The officers
are merely the agents of the corpora-

tion: Lowber v. Mayor, 4-c., of New
York, 5 Abb. Pr. 325 ; Clarke v. City
of Rochester, 24 Barb. 446; S. c., 14
How. Pr. 193. It would seem to follow
from these well-established principles,
that no default or abuse of powers, on
the part of the officers of such a corporation, can work a dissolution or constitute a ground of forfeiture.
In England a municipal corporation
may be dissolved:
(1) By an act of parliament" 2 Kyd
447 ; Coke Litt. 176 and note ; Rex v.
Amery, 2 Term Rep. 515.; Glover 408 ;
767 ; 2 Kent 305 ;
Angell & Ames,
County Com'rs v. Cox, 6 Ind. 403; State
v. Trustees, 4-c., 5 Id. 77.
(2) By the loss of an integral part:
Rex v. Morris, 3 East 215 ; Px v.
Stewart, 4 Id. 17 ; Rex v. Passmore,
2 Term R. 241 ; Regina v. Bewdley,
1 P. Wins. 207; Banbury Case 10
Mod. 346; Rex v. Tregony, 8 Id. 129;
Colchesterv. Leaher, 3 Burr. 1870; Bacon v. Robertson, 18 How. 480; Smith
v. Smith, 3 Dessaus. (S. C.) 557.
(3) By a surrender of it, franchises:
Rex v. Osbourne, 4 East 326; Rex v.
Miller, 6 Term R. 277 ; Howard's Case,
Hutton 87 ; Grant Corp. 306.
(4) By forfeiture of its charter: Rex
v. Grosvenor, 7 Mod. 199 ; Smith's Case,
4 Id. 55 ; Rex v. Sanders, 3 East 199 ;
Rex v. Kent, 13 Id. 220 ; Attorney-General v. Shrewsbury, 6 Beav. 220.
We have already seen that a municipal corporation can be abolished by an
act of the legislature, and in the
United States, where such corporations
are organized, as before stated, for
the public good, this is the only way
in which they can be dissolved. The
officers of a corporation are not an
integral part thereof, and a failure to
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elect them does not work a dissolution:
People v. Town of Fairbury, 51 Ill. 149;
Vincennes University v. Indiana, 14
How. 268; President v. Tiompson, 20
Ill. 197 ; Phillips v. Wckham, I Paige
Ch. 59; and there can be no surrender
of the franchise, certainly not without
legislative acceptance : 1 Dillon on

Mon. Corp. 111. And as the failure
to elert officers does not of itself work
a dssolution, so it cannot be made a
a ground of forfeiture, as the considerations which would preclude one result
would forbid the other: Welch v. Ste.
Genevieve, I Dillon C. C. 130.
H. B. JOHNSON.

Supreme Court of Brora of Connecticut..
ALBERT DAY v. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INSURANCE CO.
Where an insurance company declared a life policy void (do the ground that
the person whose life was insured had become of intemperate habits) and refused
to receive any further annual premiums . Held, that no present action for the sum
insured could be sustained by the policy-holder upon any implied contract to
receive the premiums and continue the policy in force during the continuance
of the lire insured.
The act of the company in refusing to receive the premiums and declaring the
policy void, could not affect the plaintiff's righis ; and if without legal excuse,
could not prevent a recovery on the policy, at the death of the party insured, but
was not such a breach of the contract as made the sum insured presently payable.
The principles of Hochster v. De la Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, and Frost v Knight,
Law Rep. 7 Exch. 11, do not apply to such a case.
In such a cae the holder of the policy may have his remedy in one of three
ways. 1. By treating the refusal as a rescission and suing to recover the present
value of the policy ; or 2, by continuing to tender the premiums, and on the ceasing of the life insured, suing for the sum insured; or 3, by going into equity to
have the policy decreed to be still in force.
THIs was an action upon a policy of life insurance by the defendant company upon the life of one Colt, in favor of one West, and
assigned to the plaintiff. The declaration averred that the defendants assumed and faithfully promised to perform all the stipulations

and agreements in said instrument on their part to be performed,
and to keep the said policy in force for the term of the whole continuance of the life of the said Colt, upon the terms and conditions
therein set forth.

It then averred payment of the annual pre-

miums until October 28th 1872, on which day another payment
fell due for the year then next ensuing, and a tender of the amount
due that day, and a refusal of the defendants to receive it.
It also

averred an express declaration by the defendants that they would
not longer continue said policy in force, and that the same had

ceased and determined, and had become null and void.
The damages were laid at $10,000, the sum insured, but the
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court below charged that the measure of damages was the amount
of premiums paid, with interest.
A verdict was rendered for the plaintiff for $3297, and the defendants filed a motion in arrest for the insufficiency of the declaration. The questions arising on the motion were reserved for the
consideration of this court.

C. -E. Perkins and J. C. Day, for plaintiff.
. C. obin8on and C. J. Cole, for defendants.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
CARPENTER, J.-It is not claimed that the alleged promise to
keep the policy in force is found in terms in the policy. The only
express promise found therein is to pay the policy upon the death
of the insured; a contract to pay in the future a certain sum of
money. But it is claimed that there is an implied promise to receive the premiums and keep the policy in force, and a breach of
this implied promise constitutes the plaintiff's whole cause of action.
"Implied contracts," says Blackstone, "are such as reason and
justice dictate, and which therefore the law presumes that every
man undertakes to perform." "Implied contracts are those which
are raised by operation of law :" 1 Swift's Digest 175. The law
raises no contract by implication unnecessarily. Therefore, where
substantial justice may be done without it, if the party in whose
behalf it is claimed does not need it to protect him in the enjoyment of some legal right, and the party against whom it is claimed
does not otherwise obtain some unfair and illegal advantage, no contract will be implied. Let us test this case by an application of
these principles.
The plaintiff purchased this policy with knowledge of the nature
of the contract; the conditions therein contained, and the obligations thereby imposed. He assumed the liabilities and the risks
growing out of the conditions, without any expectation of receiving anything in return until the policy by its terms should become
payable.
When it does become payable the defendants must pay it, unless
they have a legal defence. If the policy had become null and void,
as the defendants claimed, that would be a legal defence. But the
jury found against the defendants on that claim, and the question
recurs as to the. legal effect of refusing to receive the premiums,

DAY v.. CONNECTICUT GENERAL LIFE INS. CO.

and improperly declaring the policy void. These were the defendants' acts alone, not only without the concurrence of the plaintiff,
but against his wishes. It certainly requires no argument to show
that neither of these acts, nor both combined, would be any defence
to the action. The plaintiff then would possess all his legal rights
unimpaired, notwithstarnding the action of the defendants.
But it may be said that the refusal of the defendants to accept
the premium and recognise the continued existence of the policy,
raises a doubt as to its validity, and throws a cloud, so to speak,
over the plaintiff's property. This may be so; but the'claim that
a contract has become null and void by reason of the violation of
some condition therein contained, is not an invasion of the legal
rights of the other contracting party. If the claim is not well
founded, the party claiming it will take nothing by it, and the
legal rights of the other party will remain unimpaired. This
must be true of most contracts; hence there will be no occasion
to invoke the aid of the law to imply a contract, in addition to
that expressed by the parties. If, however, by reason of the peculiar nature of this contract, and the length of time which may
elapse before a suit can be brought on the express promise, there
is danger that the 'party may be prejudiced, perhaps 'a court of
equity, upon a proper petition, might have power to determine the
question of forfeiture in advance, and if found not to exist, to
declare the policy to be in full force. But however this may be,
we think it is quite clear that justice may be done, and the rights
of the plaintiff fully protected, without resorting to an implied
contract. Nor can it be successfully claimed that the defendants,
by their action, obtained any undue or illegal advantage. If they
were mistaken in their claims that the policy was forfeited, and if
it be true that the policy, notwithstanding such claims, remains in
full force, and that the defendants in due time will be liable
thereon, the result of the defendants' course will simply be the
loss of interest, more or less, on the premiums. The advantages
of such a result would be with the plaintiff, and not with the defendants.
Again. The law raises an implied contract, ordinarily, and
perhaps always, for the purpose of carrying into effect the presumed intention of the parties. When, therefore, the consequence
will be something entirely different from that contemplated by the
parties, or if the court cannot clearly see that the probable conseVOL. XXVIL-7
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quences were intended by the parties, no contract will be implied.
Let us apply this test. We will suppose that the defendants really
and in good faith claimed that the policy was forfeited by a breach
of the conditions. They could not receive the premium without
thereby waiving the forfeiture; and if they could, common fairness would require that they should give notice of their intention
to claim the forfeiture and decline to take the premium. Now,
according to the plaintiff's claim, they could not do this, if unsuccessful, without forfeiting all their advantages in the contract;
yea, more: they not only lose all profits, but they have actually
carried the risk during all the time the policy was in force. It is
in the nature of a penalty for making a legal claim, in good faith,
in a court of justice. It cannot be presumed that the parties
intended this. Penalties and forfeitures are odious to the law,
and when they are necessarily involved in the consequences of an
implied contract, no contract will be implied. But if there is no
forfeiture in respect to just profits, the rule of damages being,
instead of the premiums paid with interest, the plaintiff's proportion of the reserve, even then the contract would seem to be terminated with a loss to the company of all future profits. The law
will not presume that that was the intention- of the parties. If
the contract was not terminated, then a more serious objection to
an implied contract arises: a possible liability on both an implied
and an express promise ; in other words, a liability to refund
the premiums or pay the value of the reserve on an implied
promise, and ultimately to pay the sum named in the policy on the
express promise.
We think, therefore, upon principle that the law raises no such
contract as the plaintiff contends for.
We are also of the opinion that the authorities cited in support
of the plaintiff's claim are not exactly in point, and do not support
the conclusions arrived at. The leading cases are Hochster v.
Dbe la Tour, 2 E. & B. 678, and Frost v. Knight, Law Rep. 7
Exch. 111. The first was an action on a contract to employ the
plaintiff as a courier, to commence at a certain day. Before the
time arrived the defendant repudiated the contract, and declared he
would not perform it. It was held that the plaintiff might treat
that as a breach, and sue as for a breach of the contract before the
time appointed for it to commence. The ground of the decision will
appear from the following, which we copy from the opinion of Lord
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CAMPBELL, 0. J. : "But it cannot be laid down as a universal
rule, that where by agreement an act is to be done on a future day,
no action can be brought for a breach of the agreement till the day
for the doing of the act has arrived. If a man promises to marry
a woman on a certain day, and before that day marries another
woman, he is instantly liable to an action for breach of promise of
marriage. If a man contracts to execute a lease on and from a
future day for a certain term, and before that day executes a lease
to another for the same term, he may be immediately sued for
breaking the contract. So, if a man contracts to sell and deliver
specific goods on a future day, and before the day he sells and
delivers them to another, he is immediately liable to an action at
the suit of the person with whom he first contracted to sell and
deliver them. One reason alleged in support of such an action is
that the defendant has before the day rendered it impossible for
him to perform the contract at the day; but this does not necessarily follow, for prior to the day fixed for doing the act the first wife
may have died; a surrender of the lease executed might be obtained,
and the defendant might have repurchased the goods so as to be in
a situation to sell and deliver them to the plaintiff. Another reason may be that where there is a contract to do an act on a future
day, there is a relation constituted between the parties in the
meantime by the contract, and that they impliedly promised that
in the meantime neither will do anything to the prejudice of the
other inconsistent with that relation. As an example, a man and
woman engaged to marry are affianced to one another during the
period between the time of the engagement and the celebration of
the marriage. In this very case of traveller and courier, from the
day of the hiring till the day when the employment was to begin,
they were engaged to each other, and it seems to be a breach of an
implied contract if either of them renounces the engagement."
Here the words "implied promise"' and "implied contract" are
used in a very general sense, and not as indicating technically a
promise or agreement on which an action can be brought. They
seem to be used to indicate, not an independent agreement, but
something incident to and forming a part of the express promise,
and inseparable from it; a breach of which was regarded as evidence of, or equivalent to, a breach of the express contract. The
action it will be observed was not brought on an implied contract
not to "renounce the engagement," but on an express promise to
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hire the plaintiff. So, too, of the examples put by way of illustration. Lord CAMIPBELL does not say that an action will lie on an
implied promise not to lease to another, or not to sell and deliver
the goods to another, but on the express promise to lease, or to
sell and deliver goods to the plaintiff.
The case of Frost v. Knight was an action on a promise to
marry on the death of the defendant's father. While the father
was yet living the defendant broke off the engagement. It was
held that an action would lie immediately. The court says that
by the contract of marriage a "new status, that or betrothment,
at once arises between the parties. This relation it is true has not
by the law of England the same important consequences which
attached to it by the canon law and the law of many other countries.
Nevertheless it carries with it consequences of the utmost importance to the parties. Each becomes bound to the other ; neither
can consistently with such a relation enter into a similar engagement with another person; each has an implied right to have this
relation continued till the contract is finally accomplished by marriage." Here too, it will be observed, there is no intimation that
a suit may be brought for a breach of an implied agreement, but
substantially the same language is used, and in the same sense, and
for the same purposes as that used in ffochster v. De la Tour.
It -will be remembered also that the action -was not brought on an
implied promise not to marry another person, but on the express
premise to marry the plaintiff. In this case it is different. The
action is not brought on the express promise which the defendants
entered into to pay money, but on an alleged implied" promise to
receive the premiums and keep the policy in force.
The cases referred to are leading cases on the subject of maintaining actions on promises before the time arrives for their performance. They have been followed by some of the American
courts. In Butis v. Thompson, 42 N. Y. 246, they were apparently followed, but in Freer v. Denton, 61 N. Y. 492, a majority
of the court of commissioners hesitated, and it may be regarded as
an open question in that state. In Dugan v. Anderson, 36 Md.
567, the question was discussed, but not decidhd. In Massachusetts
they have been rejected, and the soundness of the principle upon
which they rest questioned: Daniel&v. Newton, 114 Mass. 530.
We have now no occasion to say whethe in a case exactly in point
we should or should not follow them, and purposely leave it an
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open question. We would remark, however, that the cases seem
to establish the proposition that an action may be brought upon a
contract in advance of the time fixed for its performance, where the
conduct of the other party has been such as to work a practical
destruction of the contract, or to deprive the plaintiff of all benefit
to be derived therefrom. The execution of a lease, and the sale of
goods to another party, and the marrying another, seem to be cases
of this character, notwithstanding the criticism of Lord CAMPBELL.
The parties had placed themselves in a position in which it was
impracticable for them to fulfil the contract and which rendered
it morally certain that they would not and could not 'perform it.
Not so in the present case. Nothing done by the defendants
rendered it impossible for them to perform their contract, or in any
way interfere with the payment of money when it should become
due. The cases referred to were not contracts for the payment of
money. One was a contract for hiring, the other was an agreement to marry. When in the one case there was a declaration by
one party that he would not hire, and that was accepted by the
other as an end of the contract, and in the other case one party
married another person, there was in each case a pretty effectual
and substantial breach of the contract. The thing agreed to be
done could not or would not be done, and nothing was left but for
the party in fault to compensate the other in damages. The
damages can be ascertained perhaps as well in an action brought
before the time for performance as afterwards. Hence, an action
on the express contract for a breach has been maintained. In this
case the contract is to pay money at a future day. Until that day
arrives there can be no breach. The party promising may cease to
exist or become bankrupt before the day, so that it will be morally
certain 'that the contract will not be performed; but that is no
breach, and will not justify the bringing of an action on the
contract.
No act of the promisor in a case like this without the consent of
the promisee, will rescind or terminate the contract, and no act of
his before the time will amount to a breach. The declaration that
he will not pay or cannot pay does not relieve him of his obligation. That still remains in force, and when the time arrives, if of
sufficient pecuniary ability, he may be compelled to perform specifically, that is, to pay the money. The reason that he gives that
he will not pay, that the promisee has done some act or omitted to
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do something whereby the contract is forfeited, does not strengthen
the claim. The reason may or may not be true. If it is true,
that of itself ends the contract, and no action can be maintained at
any time. If it is not true, the claim amounts to no'thing.
It is no invasion of the legal rights of the other party, as the
contract still remains in force. The claim of the plaintiff therefore is really this: If an insurance company makes a claim
that the policy is forfeited by a breach of some condition contained
therein, and the claim is not maintained, the policy is thereby converted into a contract to pay money at an earlier day, or some
obligation to pay money arises by implication of law, dehors the
express contract, and in some measure independent of it, -which
may be enforced immediately. Neither position is tenable, and
neither can be maintained upon principle or by authority.
This case is also to be distinguished from a class of cases where
both parties concur in treating a contract as rescinded, or, what is
the same thing, where one party repudiates the contract and declares that he will not perform it, and the other thereupon elects to
treat the contract as at an end, and brings an action as for a breach.
In such cases actions may be maintained either on the express contract or an implied contract. Where one party has paid money or
performed services for which he has' not received a fair equivalent,
the law will, if need be, imply a contract to refund or pay what is
equitably due in order to prevent injustice, and this principle has
been applied to insurance cases.
In McKee v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 28 Mo. 383, it was held
that "if the defendant company wrongfully determined the contract by refusing to receive a premium when due, then the plaintiff had a right to treat the policy as at an end, and to recover all
the money she had paid under it."
In Howland v. The Continental Life Insurance Co., 121 Mass.
499, the premium fell due on Sunday, and payment was tendered
on Monday and refused. A suit was brought eleven months afterwards, with no previous notice to the company that the plaintiff
elected to abandon the policy. The court held, that the suit could
not be maintained, on the ground that the election was not within
a reasonable time.
In McAllister v. New England Mutual Life Insurance Co.,
101 Mass. 558, the insured refused to pay a premium note, and
declared "he would not have anything more to do with the insurers,
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and abandoned the whole thing;" but he retained the policy and
the insurers retained the note; nor did it appear that they consented
to the abandonment. It was held that the policy remained in
force.
These authorities show, and that alone is the purpose for which
we cite them, that in order to terminate the policy m such cases,
the concurrence of both parties is necessary.
In Haynes v. The American Popular Life Ins. Co., 69 N. Y.
435, the company refused to receive the premiums, claiming that
the policy had lapsed. The plaintiff brought an action against
the company to have the policy adjudged in force and obtained
judgment. The judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In Cohen v. New York Mutual Life Insurance Co., 50 N. Y.
610, it was held that the court might exercise equity powers and
declare the legal status of the parties.
Thus it would seem that a person situated as the plaintiff was
may choose between two remedies. 1. He may elect to consider
the policy at an end; in which case, with a declaration containing
proper averments, he may recover the equitable and just value of
the policy. He ought not to recover more, as the policy was terminated by mutual consent, and it does not seem to be a case where
either party ought to be subjected to penal consequences. Of course
such a case should depend upon the question, whether the policy
was rightfully declared forfeited. If it was, the plaintiff cannot
recover; if it was not, he will recover the full value of the policy.
.2. If he desires that the policy shall continue, he may institute a
proceeding to have the policy adjudged to be in force, in which case
the question of forfeiture may be determined. In that case the
rights of. the parties will be determined in a reasonable time, the
"parties will be relieved of suspense and if it is decided against the
forfeiture, both parties will have what they originally contracted
for.
Perhaps, a third course is open to him; and that is, to tender
the premium, and if refused, wait until the policy by its terms becomes payable, and then test the forfeiture in a proper action on
the policy. This course may involve delay for a long series of
years, during which both parties will be in uncertainty as to their
legal rights, and it will be attended with this further disadvantage,
both parties may find it difficult to obtain proper proof.
The plaintiff in this case pursued an entirely different course.

